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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Political Islam and Democracy 
Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, one of the most popular discussion topics within 
the public and the intellectuals has been whether democracy and Islam are compatible 
or not. In a monopolarized world order, idealism of democracy - namely liberal 
democracy - is set as an ultimate stage that societies could reach.1 As in the case of 
recent Iraq operation which underruled international law, this idealism is accepted as 
the main source of moral legitimacy. As a recent example in the cases of regime 
changes in the countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Krgzystan, civil resistances were 
mobilized through the propoganda of liberal democracy.  
On the other hand, lack of democracy and liberty is considered as the main 
source of Islamic terrorism which has been the main issue on the security agenda of 
Western states since ‘September 11’. Though they had different approaches in terms 
of method, the Western countries were motivated to liberate and bring democracy to 
non - democratic Muslim countries which were considered as the potential source for 
terrorism. Recently ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA)’ was 
developed as a US initiate to bring democracy to the Muslim countries lying in the 
geography between Northern Africa and India.  
BMENA is not the first comprehensive project that is launched to achieve 
democracy idealism in the missing countries or regions. Especially liberal Western 
                                                
1
 Fukuyama, Tarihin Sonu ve Son İnsan, (İstanbul: Gün Yayınevi, 1999), 1:19. 
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countries had initiated several projects whose main target or one of the several targets 
was to achieve democracy idealism. One of these political projects was Marshall Plan 
that helped European countries to develop infractructure for liberal economy and to 
attain democracy.2 Perhaps, European Union (EU) is one of the most important and 
comprehensive international political projects targeting the development of permanent 
peace and democracy. It is the civilization project that idealizes establishing liberal 
democracy through its members. It has the criteria of liberal democracy to be fullfilled 
by the candidate states who want to join the union. In that respect, during its history 
EU accelarated the democracratization and the liberalization process in candidate and 
new member states which were formerly governed by authoritarian or non-liberal 
regimes.  
EU also gave momentum to the democratization process of Turkey as a 
candidate state. But some European political leaders and intellectuals question 
whether Turkey as a Muslim country could fullfill the EU membership conditions or 
not. Some politicians who are against the membership of Turkey argue that Turkey 
may destruct the common cultural and political values and the identity of the EU. 
Those who question Turkey’s membership support their thesis by reminding the fact 
that it is a Muslim country. Mainly, these approaches depend on the tough question 
that whether Islam is compatible with liberalism and democracy or not. On the other 
hand, many non-Western intellectuals tries to address these questions: “Whether 
liberal democracy is the most advanced type of democracy or not? Shall we think of 
liberal democracy when only the word democracy is mentioned?”  
Despite their popularity, the questions about the relation between Islam, 
namely political Islam and democracy are difficult to answer. The reason is that both 
                                                
2
 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, (Atlantic Books, 2003), 134. 
3 
political Islam and democracy are quite subjective and vague concepts. There is no 
concensus about the definition of main concepts such as political Islam, Muslim 
countries and also the characteristics of ideal democracy.  
These discussions have also been very hot issues in Turkey in the last few 
years. And notable number of Turkish intellectuals, politicians and bureaucrats 
criticize Turkey’s categorization as a Muslim country. They point out that religion has 
nothing to do in public sphere in Turkey as it is in the Western countries. It is also 
noticed that the Western countries are not described according to the religion of their 
citizens.  
At this point, we need to set the definition of democracy. Firstly, it should be 
underlined that in this dissertation when democracy is stated, liberal democracy shall 
be understood. In that context, the democracy approach of Alexis de Tocqueville will 
be referred to. Regarding Tocqueville, democracy has essentially two meanings: One 
was a political regime defined by the rule of people, with all institutional and 
procedural mechanisms that had been specified by earlier theorists of democracy; and 
the other was a condition of society characterized by its tendency towards equality.3 
There are other concepts to be dealt with such as Muslim country, Islamic 
state and political Islam. First, the country is a vague concept which contains nearly 
everything in its territory. When the term ‘country’ is used in a political terminology, 
the society living in it is intended mostly. As majority of the population living in 
Turkey is Muslim, Turkey can be categorized as a Muslim country. On the other 
hand, Islamic state refers to a state that is structured and managed with respect to the 
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 Kaldor, Vejvoda, Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe (Pinter, 1999), 3. 
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Islamic references. So that, Turkey is not an Islamic state as it is designed according 
to the laicist laws.4  
What is more, to conceptualize and to understand the concept of political 
Islam, it must be taken into account that it is not possible to talk about Islam and 
democracy in general but rather about Muslims living and theorizing Islam under 
specific historical circumstances.5 So that, when we refer to the term political Islam 
we will understand the political movement where the Muslim identity is one of the 
main characteristics of its members’ political view. Regarding that definition, it is not 
important whether the political understanding of the movement is structured with 
respect to Islam or not. Moreover, though there should be no main reference to the 
religion in the official program of any political movement it can be accepted as a 
political Islamic act if its members’ political understandings are shaped with a 
personal sensivity to Islam.   
 
1.2. AKP: A special democratization case 
When the above mentioned definition is considered, it is seen that AKP (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party) can be accepted as the movement 
of polical Islam to a certain extent. First of all, the majority of the founders of AKP 
had been the members of MGH (Milli Görüş Hareketi - The National Vision 
Movement) which was a powerful movement of political Islam in Turkey. 
Additionally, AKP is sensitive about the issues related to Muslim identity. 
Discussions related to headscarves and İmam Hatip High Schools were two of these 
issues. One of the main indicators of the Muslim identity of AKP is that; the wives of 
all important figures in the party wear headscarves. Researches which were conducted 
                                                
4
 Aköz, “İslam Devleti, İslam Ülkesi” Sabah April 2005.  
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about the social and economic status of AKP voters support these argument. The 
public survey conducted by Dr. Şaban Kızıldağ shows that 38 percent of AKP voters 
say “One of their family members is dressed in accordance with Islamic principles. 28 
percent of them host their visitors in line with Islamic principles.6” These figures 
support the fact that Muslim identity is a very powerful reference among AKP voters. 
The election triumph and the government of AKP attracted the attention of 
scholars and politicians globally. In the context of history of democratization, it was 
the first time that an Islamic rooted political movement came to power with free 
elections and performed for certain period. What is more, AKP contributed to the 
democratization of the country by making legislative changes which satisfied the 
democracy criteria of the EU.7 That is quite important because in the same era in the 
Western countries lack of democratization in Muslim countries is accepted as the 
main reason of Islamic terrorism rooted from Muslim countries.  
First of all, it must be underlined that AKP differs from traditional political 
Islamic movements in Turkey. After the ‘post-modern’ coup of ‘February 28’, the 
Islamic party RP (Refah Partisi – Prosperity Party) which had been represented in the 
government was banned. After that the reformists within RP who would be the 
founders of AKP in the future, started to search for a new type of politics. This was 
also mentioned by the founder and the president of AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan: “We have 
left behind conducting politics with religious symbols. On the other hand, we shall 
show everybody how believers should act in politics.” He was implying that they 
would no longer use a discourse that would seem as an inclination towards Shari’ah 
rule for the secular establishment.8 In that respect, the government of AKP made 
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7
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important democracy reforms to fulfill the EU Kopenhagen criteria. The AKP 
government is considered as an important stage for Westernization and 
democratization process for Turkey as it also maintains the society involvement 
within the process. Also it is argued that Turkey was going through a paradoxical 
period in which statist-Westernizing elites are forced to move into anti-Western 
positions and the West was defended by the Islamic movements.9 
Despite the above mentioned solid facts signaling for the democratic 
conversion of AKP leadership, there are still doubts about the sincerety of the 
democratization process citing the party’s Islamist lineage and the religiously 
conservative character of its leadership.10 Actually that kind of discussions which 
question the sincerety of any radical rooted political movement which came to power 
and moved to center politics, are observed all over the world in different times. 
Regarding this discussion Dankwart A. Rustow indicates that: “We should allow for 
the possibility that circumstances may force, trick, lure or cajole non-democrats into 
democratic behaviour and that their beliefs may adjust in due course by some process 
of rationalization or adaption”. In the same way, the doubts about sincerety of AKP 
do not mean much in terms of scientific approach.11 The recent discussion related to 
Kurdish and Armenian issues was also supporting the democratic conversion of AKP 
leadership.  
 
1.3. Major concepts 
The topic investigated in this dissertation is quite popular. It is hard to study such a 
topic in a scientific frame since the related concepts and terminology are still 
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evolving. Setting main concepts is very crucial to go forward. The main concepts to 
be referred in this study are as follows: Political Islam, democracy, concervative 
democracy, formal democracy, substantive democracy and political elite. These 
concepts need to be defined in the context of this dissertation. 
 Two of these concepts, political Islam and democracy are mentioned in the 
first section of my dissertation to some extent. But it must be recognized that the 
majority of the arguments about the theory of democracy are still problematic as 
democracy is used as a term of rhetoric, rather than of definite substance. As a 
practical ideal it remains unclear, incomplete, sometimes self contradictory. Under 
these circumstances, democratic theory should come by showing that embracing 
democracy means fostering specific practices and institutions.12 This approach will 
maintain the method of measuring governments regarding democracy. Therefore, 
concepts of formal (procedural) and substantive democracies need to be compared.  
Formal democracy is defined as a set of rules, procedures and institutions. The 
main criteria of formal democracy are: Inclusive citizenship, rule of law, seperation of 
powers, elected power-holders, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and 
alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and civillian control over 
the security forces. On the other hand, the substantive democracy is a process that has 
to be continuously reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in a way to 
maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they 
live to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that affect the 
society. In that sense, the existence of formal mechanism and procedure is a necessity 
but by no means a sufficient condition for democracy.  
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 Saward, The Terms of Democracy, (Mass: Polity Press, 1998) 1:2. 
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 To understand the concept of liberal democracy, the relation between 
liberalism and democracy should be examined. Liberalism is a rule of law that 
prevents certain personal rights or free spaces from the control of state. On the other 
hand as it is mentioned above, democracy is the concept where all citizens had right to 
govern the certain portion of political authority. Citizens have right to be elected and 
to vote. In that respect, political participation which is the main practice of democracy 
is also the most essential right of liberalism. So that historically liberalism and 
democracy are interrelated.13  
Conservative democracy will be another concept to be investigated under the 
topic of democracy. Even though it is not a concept that has a well established 
theoretical base, it is important for my study since it is accepted as the official party 
ideology of AKP. The party’s understanding of the concept can be summarized as: 
“The concervative democracy which is the formal view of AKP proposes universal 
democracy understanding which does not conflict with the values of comman public. 
The main dynamic of that democratization is the support of public.”14  
 As the concept of political Islam is mentioned in the first section of the 
dissertation, I will not repeat the same issues. To understand the place of political 
Islam in the global context of politics, I will refer to Daniel Bell’s arguments: “While 
the old nineteenth-century ideologies and intellectual debates have become exhausted, 
the rising states of Asia and Africa are fashioning new ideologies with a different 
apperal for their own people. In the distinctive difference between the two kinds of 
ideologies, the ideologies of 19th century were universalistic, humanistic and 
fashioned by intellectuals. The mass ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, 
instrumental and created by political leaders. And in contrary to functionalist or a 
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 Fırat, Uluslararası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu, (Ankara: Ak Parti Siyasi ve Hukuk 
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Marxist view, culture and social structure are not always related to each other.15 
What’s more, classical ideological vision had been framed in terms of the total 
transformation of the society. On the otherhand the normative consensus held that 
civil politics could replace ideological politics that no comprehensive changes should 
be introduced and no changes in the way of life should be undertaken.16”  
As it is seen above Bell takes the culture, identity and religion as the recent spaces of 
new ideology. That outlook is quite user friendly to understand the ideology of AKP, 
as it differs from other center right parties via of it’s approach towards identity and 
culture.  
The theoratical frame of the political Islam is quite vague because there is no 
concensus on a single definiton. Thefore I shall use one of the most general and 
practical definition of it: Political Islam refers to the political concepts that accept 
Islam as a system of belief that has something to say about how the politics and 
society will be ordered in modern world.17 To create more academic frame for the 
definition, we need to apply constructivism as a theoratical approach. Basically 
constructivism assumes that any society is a human construction and subject to 
multiple interpretations and influences. That approach also maintains theoratical 
frame to understand how the civil politics replaced the ideological politics so that we 
can determine the places of culture, religion and identity in the political Islam. In that 
respect, Islamic political identity is accepted as a frame of reference that is 
unconsciously internalized through socialization and becomes politicized and 
objectified in relation to desired ends and a changing social context.18   
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 Bell, The End of Ideology (Harvard University Press, 2000), 413:4. 
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 Ibid, p. 419 
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 Fuller, p. 22 
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 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, (New York: Oxford University, 2003), 20:21.  
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Since I looked for the answers to my research question among the AKP elites, 
political elite is another important concept that I dealt with in the study. In sociology 
as a common place usage, the elite refers to relatively small dominant group within a 
larger group within a larger society that enjoys privileged status.19 According to C. 
Mills Wright, at the top of ruling structure the power elite has been shaped by the 
intersection of interests between those who control the major means of production and 
those who control the newly enlarged means of violence. In that respect, the 
importance of professional politicians are declined and the explicit political command 
of the corporate chieftains and the professional warlords rose. The absence of any 
genuine civil service of skill and integrity is one of the main reason of these trends. 
What is, the power elite is composed of political, economic and military men.20 
In the light of the above stated definition, in my study ‘AKP political elite’ 
refers to the people who are active party members and the ones in ruling position of 
the party or the state. So that, I interviewed with the party elites coming from different 
political tradition and reflecting that back ground in the current political environment.  
 
1.4. Purpose 
The relation between the democracy and the political Islam is one of the most popular 
and speculative topics. This issue had not been scrutinized properly in the context of 
Turkey. By the government of current ruling party AKP which is considered as the 
political representative of political Islam in Turkey, that question has begun to be 
outspoken much more also in academic area. But still there have not been indepth 
researches about the question. This dissertation aims to contribute to this discussion 
by trying to determine the democracy understanding of the people who are elites of 
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 Daverger, Siyaset Sosyolojisi, (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, ed. 6, 2002), 160:2. 
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 Mills, The Power Elite, (New York: Oxford University, 2000), 1:20.  
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AKP which is accepted as the representative of polical Islam in Turkey. In trying to 
provide answers to this question the democracy conception of political Islam in 
Turkey can be determined. 
 
1.5. Problem 
As democracy is quite a subjective concept. Formal and substantive democracy 
concepts are developed to evaluate whether a political or govermental organization 
and their members are democratic or not. All around the World and in Turkey as well, 
the movements of political Islam are always questioned whether if they are 
democratic or not. What is more, their democracy critea and to what extend of their 
democracy understanding is also questioned. In the case of Turkey, this discussion 
will gain importance due to the EU integration process, as most of the criteria for 
joining the union are pertained to liberal democracy. Current ruling party AKP, also 
known as the current leading political representative of political Islam in Turkey, took 
very important steps towards democratization for the purpose of the EU integration. 
Being the ruling party and carrying Turkey to EU membership through 
democratization, AKP makes quite an interesting case. 
At this point the question to be asked is what the democracy understanding of 
the political Islam is in the country? Then sub-questions arise as well: What are the 
basic norms and the characteristics of this democracy understanding? Can we talk 
about the common, consolidated democracy understanding that is shared by the 
majority of its representatives? What kind of similarities and differences does this 
understanding have compared to Western (the EU and US) democracy practices? In 
that context, I will analyze the understanding of democracy among the AKP political 
elite. 
12 
In this vein, the hypothesis of my proposal can be summarized as: “The 
representatives of mainstream political Islamic movement in Turkey share common 
norms of liberal democracy understanding, though they differ in some points like the 
perception of economic liberalism and plurality.” As it will be explained in the 
following pages throughout the dissertation AKP will be accepted as the mainstream 
movement of political Islam in Turkey as it is the legitimate representative of political 
Islam in the democratic parliamentary system of Turkey.  
 
1.6. Methodology 
To answer my thesis question I am going to utilize a method of hermeneutics analysis. 
According to the method, people are born into a particular gender, culture and history. 
And any social problem must be determined in that context and it is not possible to 
bracket our assumptions of the world. So every single question is investigated in its 
own micro cosmos. In that cosmos main issues and concepts that affect the question 
take place. And that social question could be understood in that context. The concept 
of a hermeneutic circle was introduced to understand our Being – in – the - World. 
Regarding that circle, step by step we reach universality. 
In that methodology, firstly the elements of my micro cosmos is need to be 
determined. The elements of my cosmos are AKP, political Islam, conservative 
democracy, formal democracy, substantive democracy, political elite and current 
political environment. To understand my question the relationships between these 
elements are to be determined. While determining these relationships, different 
methods and resources like theoratical readings and indepth interviews will be used.21  
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 After understanding the cosmos, I move along the circles step by step. My first 
circle is the current political context of Turkey. Second circle is the political 
environment of Turkey since 1980. Next circle is the political Islam globally in the 
same period. The last circle is the development of political context in that period. At 
the end of that process I find the answer of my question in the context of global 
politics. In so doing, democracy conception of political Islam in Turkey, both in the 
current Turkish political context and global context can be evaluated. 
Current works about the political understandings of the AKP or political Islam 
in Turkey are discussed through the investigation of old policies of the movement. 
Written or verbal statements of that act and its leaders are other sources for research. 
In my work, the variables consist of complex concepts and there is no quantitative 
method to measure them. In trying to overcome that problem, the method of indepth 
interview with the AKP elites who are accepted as the party members and the ones in 
ruling position of the party is utilized. These elites were chosen by referring to the 
main sub-political fractions in AKP in order to represent the different views within 
the party appropriately. As verbal analysis are neccessary, indepth interview is 
performed as the most appropriate data collection method. By that technique, we 
could also ask indirect questions to find out the true agenda of representatives 
concerning the norm and values of democracies. It is tried to determine how the 
current representatives of political Islam understand democracy in theory and in 
practice. Here liberal democracy can be accepted as an ‘ideal’ that the AKP tries to 
attain, as it is seen on the party and government program of AKP. In that respect, 
what the AKP people think about that ideal is much more important than what the 
people do or say about the issue. So that, this dissertation aims to determine the 
democracy understanding of party elites by the help of interviews made with them. 
14 
 One of the crucial point to be successful in the method of indepth interview, is 
to structure proper medium. In my research, the set needs to reflect the general 
tendency of AKP members. AKP seems like the coalition of different political 
attitudes and backgrounds such as political Islam, liberalism and nationalism. 
Moreover, it is claimed that some party members from the South-Eastern Anatolia 
take political stand in the Kurdish issue. These fractions should be represented in my 
interview set.  
 The recent concrete case to determine the portions of those fractions in the 
party is the municipality elections. Recent municipality election is important as it is 
the last representative election. AKP (Adalet ve Kalkýnma Partisi - Justice and 
Development Party) won the election in 59 cities. The portions of fraction is quite 
important. 23 mayors were formerly members of the political parties of RP (Refah 
Partisi – Welfare Party) and FP (Fazilet Partisi – Virtue Party) which were 
representative political Islam, 12 from ANAP (Anavatan Partisi – Motherland Party), 
7 from DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi – Right Way Party), 1 from CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi – Republican Public Party), 1 from MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - 
Nationalist Movement Party). There are 15 mayors who had no political experience 
but most of them seems to stand in the liberal right-wing. AKP also won the election 
in four cities: Ağrı, Siirt, Bingöl and Van where traditionally support parties that refer 
to Kurdish issue. The result of ‘November 3rd 2002 General Parliamentary Election’ 
also provides important data to classify the ethnic portions of fractions in party. The 
percentage of parliaments from Southeastern Anatolia in total AKP parliaments is 
%14.22  
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 Tekin, Ak Parti’nin Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimliği, (Istanbul: Orient, 2004), 231.  
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 Apparently, the ones coming from political Islam are nearly %40; the ones 
from liberal right are more than %30; the ones from the Southeastern Anatolia are 
nearly %15 and the ones from nationalist movement are nearly %5. As the portion of 
nationalist representatives is less than expected, we need more informal data. In the 
recent story covered in Turkish Daily News, it is argued that the number of nationalist 
AKP parliaments varies between 10 to 30.23 If we accept it as 30, it means nearly %15 
of AKP parliamenterians have nationalist tendency. As DEHAP could not overcome 
the %10 election barrier, AKP took most of the parliamentary seats that represent the 
cities which have dominantly Kurdish population. So more than %15 of AKP 
parliaments come from those cities. But it must be taken into account that most of 
them have political view of liberalism or political Islam. So %15 of my interview set 
is composed of AKP elites from South-Eastern cities. The rest of my set consists of 
party members who are originally from other parts of Turkey. That sub-set which 
represents the %85 of main set is composed of %15 nationalist, %30 liberal right and 
%40 political Islamist. 
 According to that distribution, 15 AKP elites are selected and interviewed 
with. The number was restricted up to 15 as indepth interview is quite time 
consuming and that could cause problem in terms of time table. While forming 
interview questions, both formal and substantive criteria of democracy were 
considered. As examples of formal criteria, ‘inclusive citizenship, rule of law, 
seperation of powers, elected power-holders, free and fair elections, freedom of 
expression and alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and 
civillian control over the security forces’ were scrutinized. As the main criteria of 
substantive democracy, ‘constitutional issues and legality, human rights and minority 
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rights, political rights, media, administration, local government and civil society’ were 
investigated. 
 
1.7. Scope of the Study 
First chapter of the dissertation deals with ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘political Islam’ 
which have been two important issues both for Turkey and the World since the end of 
Cold War. The interaction between these two issues and the question whether Islam 
and liberal democracy are compatible or not, gained importance much more since 
‘September 11’. In that context, AKP which is a political Islam originated party came 
to the power in Turkey by November 3, 2002 elections. Since then, AKP is the 
governing party in Turkey. Till now AKP has been the main political actor for the 
democratization process by making legislative reforms to satisfy EU criteria.  
The governance of AKP has been a very important experience both for Turkey 
and the World. It was the first time in the history that political Islamic movement 
came to power by a democratic process and governed the country without any anti-
democratic intervention. Even more, it has been the main political agent for 
democratization. It is crucial to understand the democracy perspectives of AKP elites 
and supporters, so that we can grasp the democratization process that AKP has been 
going through and project what might happen in the future. In this chapter, the 
research method for understanding the democratization perspectives of AKP elites is 
set. Following the first chapter, second chapter deals with the global political Islam 
and its evaluation. Looking at the global picture I will try to analyze the prospective 
impact of global political Islam on the AKP in the upcoming chapters, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Recent history of political Islam in the World 
 
In my work, I deal with the question, “What is the democracy understanding of the 
political Islam in Turkey?” So that, the concept of “political Islam” lies in the heart of 
my work. As the political Islam is a global concept, its history and theory must be 
determined in a global context. In doing so, we can compare political Islamic 
movements in Turkey with their global equivalents; and determine similarities and 
differences. 
  
2.1. Global political trends and their impacts  
The history of political Islam can not be understood appropriately unless what Muslim 
societies and states has gone through is taken into consideration. It is seen that 
political Islam has been alive and enforced by the history of civilization of Islam 
dating back to 16th century. If it is accepted that political Islam refers to the political 
concepts which argue that Islam as a system of belief has something to say about how 
the politics and society will be regulated in the modern world, we should better 
understand the impact of that history.24 The members of political Islam refer to that 
portion of history in their arguments and argue that Muslim countries were successful 
in the history as they were ruled by the law of Islam. 
 Emergence of the political Islam as a modern political act needs also to be 
evaluated in its historical context. First, an activist Hasan el-Benna initiated a political 
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movement and used the concept of Islamic state in 1950s. From that moment on, 
political Islam has gone through an evaluation. It is not a coincidence that political 
Islam emerged in that period. It is because, in the 19th century Muslim World 
encountered a series of Western military, ideological and cultural attacks. 20th 
century was the period of collapse of Muslim World and its institutions. In that era, 
the Ottoman, the Greatest Muslim Emperor in the history and Califate collapsed, 
Western imperials began to controll Arabic states directly and the Jewish state was 
established in the Muslim geography.25  
After World War II, most of the Muslim states achieved political 
independence. Muslim states have been under the impact of modern ideologies like 
socialism, communism, nationalism, facism. Almost in every Muslim states, the 
governments were held by small group of elites. Till the 1980s, it could be argued that 
the people in the Muslim World reacted to the dominant power of the West and the 
modernism by trying to understand and adopt them. With the decrease in oil earnings 
in Muslim countries; political Islam which refers to Islam religion to solve the 
problems of society, began to rise and gain power in Muslim societies. Iran Islamic 
revolution in 1979 gave important impetus to political Islam against Westernization.26 
In 1991 political Islamic party FIS won the elections in Algeria but the results were 
cancelled by state authorities. 
By the end of the Cold War, new era for the polical Islam began. In the power 
balance of Cold War great social problems in Muslim World were able to be 
repressed easily. The end of Cold War initiated a new period for Muslim societies and 
for the states. It is argued that by the end of the Cold War the democracy began to 
spread through most of the world; and as a result, the globalization rose up through 
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that democratic climate. In practice, people around the globe began to be more 
connected to one another more than ever and so did the Muslims. Information and 
money began to flow more quickly than ever. Goods and services which were 
produced in one part of the world were increasingly available in all parts of the world. 
International travels were more frequent. On the other hand, as critics of 
globalization, national societies are being integrated into a global economic system 
and buffeted by economic and technological forces over which they have little 
control. For them, the global economic problems of the late 1990s proved that costs of 
globalization were much greater than its benefits.27  
To criticize globalization, one of the most precise and referred definition is 
used especially by some oppositional American social scientists: It shows the 
hegemonic aspect of the globalization and helps us in understanding its impacts on 
terrorism: “The current trend for political, economic and cultural institutions of the 
West to be spread around the world is called globalization.”28 This simple definition is 
consistent with two famous works written by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel 
Huntington whose views are perceived as the declaration of superiority of the West 
and its values, institutions. Furthermore some Muslim intellectuals believed that the 
ideas of these two social scientiests are very important for understanding the US 
strategy that puts Muslim world in threat possessing position. According to them even 
though Westernization won the war against communism, it did not keep its promises 
to Muslim societies. In that respect Ahmet Davutoğlu states that:    
“These observations and existing political realities necessitate a re-evaluation 
of the strategic position of the Muslim world in the post - Cold War era. First 
of all, we have to search for the veiled factors and reasons which lead policy 
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makers of the systematic Great powers to intensify military and strategic 
operations in the Muslim world and which lead political theoreticians to 
present Islam as a threat to the World system. The basic reason for declaring 
the Muslim world as a threat is the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-
strategic potentialities of the Muslim world and the need for ideological 
justification for strategic and tactical operations in order to have a control over 
these potentialities.”29  
For Davutoğlu, presentation of Islam as a potential enemy has resulted in three 
phenomena related to the Muslim world: “It encouraged oppressive political 
tendencies in Muslim countries. Western powers which promote democratic values 
and mechanism in other parts of the world supported undemocratic regimes in the 
Muslim world. The rationalization was simple: a democratic system in the Muslim 
world may create Islamic regimes with anti-western sentiments. Such a rationalization 
shows that the basic motive behind this presentation is their political interests rather 
than democratic values.”30  
Whether they are right or wrong, it must be taken into consideration that the 
ideas above are the diluted expressions of critics to the idea of Western oriented 
globalization, which is accepted by a notable portion of Muslim World. As certain 
social scientists argued globalization in that respect is a new phenomenan and its 
unpredictable results is going to appear after a certain time. Regardingly, second half 
of the 1990s gave important signals: Financial crisis in many developing economies 
of the world like East Asian countries, Russia, Argentina; the ethnic conflicts in many 
parts of the world like Balkans, Caucasus and the rise of new types of fundamental 
terrorism. The ‘September 11’ was perhaps the most critical date when democracy 
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and globalization were questioned and their probable negative impacts began to be 
discussed. 
 The two main types of ideologies, nationalism and religion based ideologies, 
had significant importance after the Cold War and are considered as one of the most 
negative impacts of globalization. Here fundamentalism is referred in general terms 
for all religions, rather than Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, these ideologies have 
deep roots in the history and had increasing trends for decades before the Cold War. 
In the late 1970s, fundamentalists began to rebel against the secularist hegemony and 
started to wrest religion out of its marginal position and back to center stage.31 
It is obvious that they both had much more important definitive role in global 
politics in the last decade. The characteristics of nationalism and fundamentalism in 
the last decade were mainly different from what they have been before. Most of their 
fractions began to communicate with violence which is mainly terrorism. To 
understand their increasing importance, it should be recognized that both nationalism 
and religion based ideologies are not just doctrines, but a more basic way of talking, 
thinking and acting.32 They offer consistent alternative to the individuals who feel 
themselves under the attack of globalization and its features. They help individuals to 
define their identity.  
To sum up, the collapse of Cold War opened new doors for religion based 
ideologies. The rise of political Islam in that term is the concrete example for that 
argument. By the end of Cold War, it became hard to answer the political demands by 
the manistream, modarate, statist political acts. Public feel free to go to the so called 
marginal acts as national threats to the states lost their importance by the collapse of 
Warsaw pact. As those movements took more support from the public they began to 
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move towards moderate lines. Those movements saw that the only way to legitimaze 
their existence in democractic life is to accept the rules of global political system. On 
the other hand, global political system accepted the legitimacy of those movements as 
the Muslim countries need to be democratized and liberalized to integrate global 
system and those Islamic movements are important political tool for that 
democratization process. The acceptance of Taliban government in Afghanistan as 
legitimate leadership before 11th September was the extreme example of that 
approach. The government of AKP in Turkey and the rise of Muslim brothers as a 
legitimate democratic act can be determined by that approach. The election victory of 
Hamas in Palastine election help in 2006, is the recent result of that politics. 
 
2.2. Characteristics of political Islam 
Even though it is not a well established concept, the definition of political Islam needs 
to be determined to build a frame for discussion. Political Islam can not be determined 
without referring to the above mentioned history of political Islam, as it is evaluated 
in a historical context. Though there are several definitions, I prefer to use the 
following definition: Political Islam refers to the political concepts which define Islam 
as a system of belief. It has something to say about how the politics and the society is 
going to be ordered in modern world. In that context, Islamist is the one who believes 
that idea and try to practice it in different extends.33 Political Islam uses the sources 
and the references of Islam for a certain political goal. It must be underlined that 
political Islam is a concept, rather than an ideology.34 It must be underlined that in the 
political discourse of political Islam, history always played crucial role. Political 
Islamists who believe that Islam has something to say about how the politics and 
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society will be ordered in modern world needs to refer history to proof that once in the 
history it succeded to order the society. And referring history he/she argues that if 
Muslims come back to Islam again, it will be possible to establish happy social and 
political order. Also in Turkey political Islamic acts mostly referred to the history, 
mainly Ottomans. Same approach is also observed in the political elites I interviewed 
with. But it must be noticed in officicial papers and top leves declarations such an 
approach is not observed. 
Before talking about the characteristics of political Islam, first it must be 
determined that there are mainly three mainstream types of movements of political 
Islam: The fundamentalists, the traditonalists and the modernists.35 The traditionalists 
and the modernists are the ones that have the greatest impact on politics and society. 
What’s more most of the political Islamic movements have certain common 
characteristics in practice.  
First, it must be noticed that political Islamic acts have also common 
characteristics in terms of socioeconomic classes which they depend on. Historically, 
traders have important status in Muslim societies since the birth of Islam. It is also 
argued that Islam is the idelogical super structure of traders.36 In modern political acts 
of Islam, that kind of relation between Islam and bourgeoise is observed in Turkey. 
Furthermore, that kind of Islamic movements are mostly initiated with white collars. 
Rural originated teachers, doctors and engineers are the classes which supplied most 
of the political Islam leaders. This is also the fact for political Islam in Turkey.   
Since political Islamic movements are mostly banned or their activities are 
restricted, they tend to organize in civil services and NGOs. For example, they offer 
free health and educational services. So that they establish organic relationship with 
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large segments of community. The first political Islamic act in the history, the 
Egyptian Muslim Brothers is also the first example of those services. All political 
Islamic parties in Turkey organized different types of free public services under the 
organization of MGH (Milli Görüş Hareketi - The National Vision Movement). It 
resulted with a sympathy of large volume of poor citizens to the political Islam.  
Except the fundamentalist ones like Taliban, most movements have modern 
characteristics in terms of trying to structure political solution to the daily life 
problems of citizens. They try to do so in the context of current historical and 
socioeconomical perspective. The adoption speed of Islamists to the new technologies 
is an important indicator for this. 
Anti-imperialism and anti-Western rhetoric have great impact on the 
emergence of nearly all movements of political Islam. It is the fact that, imperialist 
heritage had important impact for the emergence of political Islam. But the interaction 
between anti-imperialist affluence and Islamic identity has the mechanism that feeds 
one other. Therefore, it is hard to set the cause and result relation between them. For 
example, in Egypt anti-imperialist tendency has always been dominant for the 
emergence of political Islam. On the other hand, in Turkey doctrination of political 
Islam which mainly underlines the Islamic identity of citizens, has utilized imperialist 
rheoteric.  
* * * 
To recapitulate, this chapter has dealt with the recent history of global political 
Islam. It covers the evaluation of political Islam since 1980s. Political Islam is a 
global issue because there is a high interaction among political Islamic movements 
around the world. The story of the modern political Islam is quite short. It goes back 
to 1950s. Having looked at its history, Chapter 2 also covers the basic definitions 
25 
related to the topic. Political Islam can be defined as follows: Political Islam refers to 
the political concepts that accept Islam as a system of belief that has something to say 
about how the politics and society will be ordered in modern world.37 Following the 
end of Cold War era, political Islam has been the ‘rising star’. Political Islam has been 
the only threatening-opposing act against liberal democracy.  
 Having looked at the global history of political Islam, in Chapter 3 we deal 
with the recent history of the political Islam in Turkey. I will also try to figure out the 
impacts of global Islamic acts on the political Islamic movements in Turkey. 
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Chapter 3 
Recent history of political Islam in Turkey  
 
This chapter will reveal the charecteristics of political Islam and political environment 
of Turkey. For establishing microcosmos of my study I need to relate these 
charecteristics. Regarding my methodology, I start first with determining political 
environment than investigate the impacts of global political Islam the political 
environment.  
 
3.1 Political environment in Turkey 
The military coup of 1980 initiated a new era for politics in Turkey. First of all, the 
new political center of the country shifted towards the right. It is believed that the 
state establishment began to approach political Islam with more tolerance, in order to 
balance the left-wing movements. In 1983 the free election was held and ANAP came 
to the power as the leading party. In its government period, ANAP took serious steps 
towards democratization. Actually, in ANAP there was a number of leaders who had 
political Islamic heritage. By the end of 1990s Islamic identity of citizens were mainly 
represented by ANAP. By the help of neoliberal politics of ANAP, Islam had the 
opportunity to be brought into public space to some extend. Of course, global political 
trends had considerable impacts over those policies. Anti-communism was the 
umbrella rheoteric for whole scala of right movements. In that term the issue of 
democracy is not mentioned seriously by the political Islamists in Turkey. 
By the 1990s, the Iron Curtain collapsed and the communism threat was over 
in a way that shifted the agenda of politics both globally and locally. Since the 
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common threat of communism to right wing politics ended; covering the right 
political movements like nationalism and political Islam by a certain political party 
like ANAP, became harder. In that period nationalist and Islamist parties had reached 
considerable election success.  
In that period, internal politics of Turkey experienced a crucial evaluation. 
First, ANAP as the liberal oriented party that represents nationalists and political 
Islamists lost that identity as a result of the decision made by the party leadership who 
tried to position the party as a Western type of liberal party that dismisses Islamists. 
By a series of economical crisis and corruption scandals in governing parties the 
citizens started to look for alternatives. Moreover, rising Kurdish terrorism polarized 
the society and shifted lots of parameters in the country. In that context, an Islam 
oriented party RP and it’s successors FP and AKP rose their votes during 90s. In 
1991, RP got 16.4 percent of votes in general election and began to be accepted as a 
major candidate for the government. In the next elections in 1995 it was the leading 
party by taking 21.4 percent of total votes. But mainly by the promotions of state 
establisments and TUSİAD which is the organization of big conglomarates in Turkey, 
the two center right parties ANAP and DYP built up a coalition. However, because of 
the political rivalry between the leaders of these two parties, the coalition collapsed in 
a year and RP had the opportunity of establishing the government. On June 28, 1996, 
for the first time, the Turkish Republic had a prime minister whose political 
philosophy was based on Islam.38  
In the process of RP election victory two facts have to be underlined. Despite 
the fact that citizens gave credit to the center right parties to govern Turkey, those 
parties wasted that credit with corruption scandals and personal ambitions. And the 
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citizens began to code the liberal politicians at the center as the political opportunists. 
On the other hand, in the municipal election in 1994, RP won important cities, and it 
had a chance to show its political practices. Most of the RP municipal presidents 
performed much better than the former presidents and citizens had the chance to 
compare the RP’s operations with the other parties.   
After the coup of 1980, it is observed that the Turkish state has pursued a dual-
track policy of co-option and containment by providing more options to Islamist 
groups to participate in political and economical processes. Meaningly, it is observed 
that social and political basis of the Islamic movement had experienced a major 
transformation at the grassroot level.  The rhetoric and politics of RP shifted from 
MSP which was the representative of political Islam before 1980. RP abandoned the 
politics of anti-global, market oriented, small merchant and farmer’s party. Instead it 
demanded full integration into the global market and saw a reduced role for the state 
in the economy.39   
 
3.2. Impact of global political Islam  
The concept of ‘Islamic state’ is used in 1950s for the first time by Hasan el-Benna 
who founded the political organization of Muslim Brothers in 1928.40 The 
organization of Muslim Brothers could be accepted as the first modern political 
Islamic political group. So that, the term used in the 1950s could be accepted as the 
term when modern thought of political Islam emerged. Since then, political Islam 
differentiated as a numbers of acts which differ in terms of philosophy or practice. In 
that term serious interactions are observed between them. For example, Muslim 
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Brothers spreaded to other Sunni Arap countries. The Iran Islamic revolution had 
impact over mainly Lebonan which has important portion of Shia minority.  
All these global acts of political Islam had also an impact over movements of 
political Islam in Turkey to a certain extend. The main reason that limited the impact 
is the social, political and historical heritage of Turkey that is mainly linked to 
Ottoman. Contrary to Egypt and other Arap nations, Turkey did not experience 
imperialism. Therefore, different from these countries, anti-imperialism was never 
quite important of a thought in the birth of political Islam in Turkey.  
Islam in Turkey was never a revolutionary or political tool that is used to 
liberate the country, as once it had been in Egypt or in Algeria. Islam rather formed 
part of a peaceful and obedient society, not of violent and revolutionary politics. This 
quiescence was the result of the fact that from the beginning of its imperial phase the 
Ottoman Empire had tied religion to itself by controlling the education and 
appointment of clergy.41  
Another important difference between Turkey and the other Muslim countries 
is that: Turkey tries to establish tax based liberal economy. It results with the rising 
middle class which also consists of conservative traders. For example, threre are 
700,000 small merchants all over the country who have mostly conservative 
thoughts.42 As one of the most dynamic segments of political Islamic movements in 
Turkey, they always maintained political Islam as a form of modarate and liberal 
politics. Many of the important figures of political Islam, like Erbakan, Ali Coşkun 
are associated with the business associations of that social class. They want to 
integrate and do business with the international markets.  
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On the other hand in Middle Eastern Muslim countries, nearly 90 percent of 
workforce works in state establishments of companies. So that in contrary to Turkey, 
Middle Eastern and North African countries has never been tax based economy. And 
the ruling class formulated that fact as: “No tax, no right of representation”.43 In 
addition to these facts, though it was interrupted by military coup, free democratic 
elections was held in Turkey since 1950. Political Islamic movements are mostly 
indirectly represented in different parties. Therefore, political Islam had the 
opportunity to form relations with governments and state establishment. Since 1970 
political Islam is directly represented by a political party which espoused an Islamist 
political philosophy.44 The 1970s also witnessed the uprising of global political Islam 
in most of the Muslim World. Though this is a coincidence of chronology, there is not 
concrete interaction between the global political Islam and the ones in Turkey. 
The Iranian revolution held in 1979, had an impact over some marginalized 
groups of political Islam. Iran helped some terrorist organizations which aim to 
establish Islamic state in Turkey.4546 The terrorist network Hizbullah which is 
established in the early 1980s is the most powerful one among these groups. But due 
to the differences between belief systems and historical heritage of Iran, it never had 
considerable impact over mainstream political Islam in Turkey.  
1990s were perhaps the golden ages of political Islam in Turkey, where acts in 
the other Muslim countries encountered serious bottlenecks. For example; Iranian 
Islamic State could not satisfy its promise to people. In Algeria though FIS -political 
Islamic act- won the elections, it was banned by the army. To sum up, political Islam 
had not been successful in the democratic process. On the other hand, it took place in 
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political agenda via terrorist or guerilla acts. Afganistan and Cechenya were two 
similar examples. 9/11 terrorist attacks to the US was one of the most terrifying 
moments for the history of political Islam when it is began to be seen equal with 
terrorism. It was great irony that AKP which is an important symbol for the 
democratization process of political Islamic movements, had been established nearly 
two months before that attacks. For the first time in the history of political Islam in 
the World, an Islamic originated party AKP succeeded to win the free democratic 
elections and held the government in Turkey.47     
* * * 
To summarize, this chapter deals with the recent history and the evaluation of 
political Islam in Turkey. Both local and global political and social developments had 
a notable impact on the rise of political Islam in Turkey from 1990 and onwards. 
However no significant correlation is spotted between the global political Islam and 
political Islamic movements in Turkey in that period.   
Having overviewed the evaluation of global political Islamic movements; in 
the next chapter we will discuss the interaction between the political Islam and 
democracy. Additionally, types of democracy and criteria of democracy are 
determined. 
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Chapter 4 
Democracy 
 
As I am looking for an answer to the question “What is the democracy understanding 
of political Islam in Turkey?”, I need to deal with the concept of democracy both in a 
global and local context. So, I need to relate the democracy to both local and global 
developments. It can be seen both in global and local media that the concept 
‘democracy’ is very popular. It has been perhaps, the main concept that collects 
Western countries in the same political direction. It has been the main concept for the 
political legitimization of the states and the leaders. Also in local political context, 
democracy has been the main issue of political legitimization for the political leaders. 
In addition to those, both in global and local arena the relation between Islam and 
democracy is questioned a lot. So that, by considering the global issues the concept of 
democracy and its impacts on global and local political agenda are needed to be 
understood.  
 
4.1. Different democracy understandings 
The collapse of Cold War meant also the victory of ideals and values of Western 
World.48 During the Cold War, liberal democracy is accepted as the umbrella 
ideology of Western Pact. By the end of Cold War, there has been no global ideology 
challenging liberal democracy. Consequently, leader of Western Pact, US was able to 
make use of liberal democracy as means of legitimazition in international politics 
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more freely. In that respect, US also believed that the lack of liberal democracy in 
Muslim World is the main reason of terrorism which is rooted there.    
So that, the main theoratical frames of democracy need to be determined. One 
of the most practical definitions of democracy is made by Alexis de Tocqueville. 
According to him, democracy had essentially two meanings. One was a political 
regime defined by the rule of the people, with all the institutional and procedural 
mechanisms that had been specified by earlier theorists of democracy; and the other 
was a condition of society characterized by its tendency towards equality.49 
As theory of democracy has normative characteristics and it evaluates or 
prescribes governmental conditions, it is hard to reach a consensus about it. In 
general, there are two types of democracy: Formal and substantive. Procedural view 
of democracy prescribes a set of normative principles for democratic decision-
making. Formal democracy is defined as sets of rules, procedures and institutions. 
The main criteria of formal democracies are: inclusive citizenship, rule of law, 
seperation of powers, elected power-holders, free and fair elections, freedom of 
expression and alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and 
civillian control over the security forces.  
It can be argued that the key feature of procedural democracies is that much 
greater attention and importance is attached to the rules and procedures by which 
decisions are reached than to the particular decision itself. For example, political 
rights such as the right to vote, freedom of speech and assembly, right of privacy and 
travel are far more important than the economic rights.50 
On the other hand substantive democracies focus on the fairness or justice of 
governmental decisions and actions but the process by which they are reached is not a 
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major consideration. Political rights are far less important than economic rights such 
as housing, education and medical security.51 So, it can be argued that, substantive 
view evaluates democracy on the basis of substance of government policies. 
Substantive democracy is a process that has to be continually reproduced, by 
regulating power relations in such a way to maximize the opportunities for individuals 
to influence the conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence debates 
about the key decisions that affect society. In that sense, the existence of formal 
mechanism and procedure is a necessity but it is not a sufficient condition for 
democracy. For example, today some of substantive theorists require that democratic 
government must guarantee civil rights and liberties. As it is mentioned above, some 
should also add social and economic rights to be the list of substantive outcomes as 
democracy insurances. 
 
4.2. Democracy understanding of political Islam 
As West accepts liberal democracy as the ultimate phase of democracy, it tries to 
understand how the Muslim societies and states are compatible to democracy and 
liberalism. The answer is important, since regarding the answer they need to attain 
first liberalism then democracy or vice versa. The scholars did not reach any 
conclusion, as there happens to be more than one definition for both democracy and 
Islam. What’s more, the Western scholars could not build up proper model to study 
and understand the democratization in Muslim societies. Actually, they tried to 
understand it in the historical context of Western democratization experience.52 
Except the culturalists like Huntington, most scholars argue that in theory 
there is not any reason for Islam and democracy not to be compatible. But in the 
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current context of Islam and Muslim societies, there are several social, historical and 
economical reasons that prevent the development of liberal democracy in Muslim 
societies.53  
Gudrun Kramer investigates the recent and mainstream acts of political Islam 
and concludes that today moderate, pragmatic Islamists have come to accept crucial 
elements of political democracy. But they did not have adopted liberalism.54 Another 
anaysis of Muslim societies regarding democracy and liberalism is made by James Q. 
Wilson. He questions the links between democracy and Muslim societies as well as 
the links between liberalism and Muslim societies. Contrary to Kramer’s conclusion, 
he argues that liberalism is much easier than democracy to be atttained in the short 
run.
55
 
Acts of political Islam can be classified into three groups regarding their 
political attitudes and understandings: Fundamentalists, traditionalists, modernists. In 
that respect, it is hard to talk about a common approach of political Islam towards 
democracy. We should overview the approach of main franctions of political Islam 
towards Islam. Fundamentalists are investigated under two groups: Radical 
fundamentalists, scriptural fundamentalists. Radical fundamentalists gather 
democracy as a wrongful creed. They think that sovereignty and the right to legislate 
belong to God alone. On the other hand, scriptural fundamentalists accept Islam as a 
form of democracy. They argue that: The West has no right to define what democracy 
should be like, and the Islamic form is superior because it rests on the only correct 
and perfect religion.56  
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Traditionalists are also fragmented into two: Conservative traditionalists, 
reformist traditionalists. Conservatives think that there is some room for democratic 
instruments in the interpretation of Islamic practice in community life and in certain 
sectors of public life. On the other hand, reformists think that Islam at heart has been 
democratic from its inception; the communities of believers is sovereign, and even the 
earliest leaders were chosen by democratic means. As the last fraction, modernists 
argue that Islam contains democratic concepts that need to be brought to the 
forefront.57  
The classification of the above mentioned fractions of political Islam 
according to the segmentation under procedural and substantive democracies will help 
us understand these groups globally. Though radical fundamentalists reject the idea of 
democracy, we can evaluate scriptural fundamentalists under substantive democracy. 
On the other hand, both groups of traditionalists belong to substantive democracy 
point of view. As a last group, modernist could be evaluated between formal and 
substantive democratic point of view. 
 
4.3. Democracy as an instrument of political legitimization 
Though, it was not until the 20th century that democracy was widely regarded as a 
good thing, today it’s popularity is such that only very few and marginal politicians or 
observers have a bad word to say about it.58 Especially in the last two decades the 
concept of liberal democracy has began to be argued as the highest level of 
democracy, that is accepted as one of the most powerful values for Western 
civilization. Hegel had been the first thinker who proposed that the end of history will 
arise when the humanity reached to the ideal form of society which is liberal 
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democracy. Nearly two centuries after Hegel, his follower Francis Fukuyama 
announced that the humanity reached its highest level of civilization by the collapse 
of communism.59 Especially after the World War II, liberal democracy had been the 
most common political ideal and cultural value of West. Huntington as an influentual 
culturalist historian, underlined the links between democracy and Western 
civilizations.60 He determined the history of democracy in three waves of democracy, 
all of them emerged through or empowered by West. First long term democratization 
wave has begun in US when the majority of males got the right of voting in 1820s. 
Till 1926, 29 democracies emerged. By the end of the World War II, the second wave 
of democracy emerged. Till 1962, 36 countries began to be governed by democracy. 
In 1970s, the third wave of democracy started. The collapse of Soviet Block was the 
peak point of that wave.61 
Since the World War II, liberal democracy had been at the top of political 
agenda of Western Pact. It legitimizated its struggle or wars against the other political 
systems with the aim of attaining liberal democracy. World War II was the war 
among liberal democracy, communism and fascism. After World War II, the Cold 
War took place between communism and liberal democracy. By the end of World 
War II, US initiated comprehensive economical, political and social programs to build 
up liberal democracy in countries like Japan and Germany which were formerly 
totalitarian. By the end of Cold War, the US establishment announced that the new 
war should be between liberal democracies and totalitarian regimes. George Bush 
announced the concept of ‘New World Order’ which mainly depends on the values of 
liberal democracies. Spreading the ideals of liberal democracy to the World was the 
new challenging and also proactive project of the US.  
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Whether it is political or real means of war, the democratic countries need 
political legitimization, in practice public support to go to war. For that support, the 
public needs to feel the real means of threat. That threat and political legitimization 
were emerged by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The US political establishment launched a 
strategy to combat with terrorism and announced that the current war was between 
democracy and terrorism. Though the totalitarian regimes are still called as enemies, 
the reformulated message given to the public could be summarized such that: “The 
direct enemy is terrorism but the target is not only terrorist groups but every sources 
and units which support terrorism. In other words, totalitarian regimes as they support 
terrorism.” And the policy evolved to the doctrine where hard power can be used if it 
is necessary. It was named as ‘War on Terrorism’. In that context, the US President 
George W. Bush stated in September 29, 2001 that, “Our war on terror will be much 
broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. The war will be fought 
wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.” It is clear that Bush administration has 
thought of the war on terrorism quite literally, as a real war.  
The war was between liberal democracy and totalitarian understanding which 
results with terrorism. The authoritarian states namely North Korea, Iraq, Iran and 
Syria had been announced as evil states which support terrorism directly or indirectly. 
In that respect, US argued that it has right to use power to prevent terrorism.62 The 
intervention of Afghanistan in 2001, and of Iraq in 2003 were performed via this new 
US strategy regarding the ‘War on Terrorism’. These wars were legitimized that if 
liberal democracies are to be establihed in these states, they will no more be the units 
in global system that produce terrorism. So that, spreading liberal democracy had 
been the legitimization of fighting with these evil states. 
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In parallel to the above mentioned ideals, US launched the project named as 
BMENA which aims to bring liberalism and democracy to the region in between 
North Africa and Pakistan. It declared that it will support the democracy demands of 
the citizens of countries in that region. The other G-8 countries which had opposed to 
Iraq operation, declared their support to this project. The aim was announced as 
fighting with the social, economical and political sources of terrorism. Nearly all 
countries in the region mentioned above are Muslim, it was argued that the aim was 
understood by some analyst as spreading democracy to the Muslim World.63 
On the other hand, new wave of democracy emerged in the post communist 
countries which were still under the political dominance of Russia. In Serbia, Ukraine, 
Georgia, Krygzistan the opponent groups had been organized against the governments 
which prevent free and transparent elections.646566 The US based organizations and the 
political support of Western countries played a crucial role in the success of these 
movements. In all these processes, the ideal of liberal democracy played a crucial role 
as a tool of legitimization.6768 
Also for the European Union (EU) bringing and maintaing the values of liberal 
democracy had been one of the most crucial political targets. These values took place 
in the documents of EU.69 During 1970s, Spain, Portugal and Greece joined the Union 
and EU helped them attaining liberal democracy. Similar process is seen in another 
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enlargement process of EU towards Eastern Europea. These countries fulfilled the 
obligations which are in parallel to values of liberal democracy, to the member of the 
union. It also produced partnership strategy with Mediterrian countries, Ukraine and 
Russia in the aim of supporting democratization and liberalization process. 
Western Pact legitimated all these efforts by the ideal of establishing and 
maintaining liberal democracy to where it lacks. That ideal is announced to its public 
or World community as democracy. Democracy is easier concept than liberal 
democracy to be understood and be accepted. It is also argued that except Muslim 
countries, liberal democracy is accepted as the most ideal system of government by 
most of the states in the World.70 It is proposed that it brings freedom and prosperity 
which every human being has right to own.  
 
4.4. Democracy record of Turkey 
Turkey is accepted as the only Muslim country which is governed by democracy. 
Turkey has free elections for more than 50 years. Though there were some 
interruptions by military coups, democratization and liberalization process had been 
improved in that period. After all of the coups, military went back to its barracks in a 
certain period and free elections have been held. It is seen that by the coups military 
aimed to stabilize the political chaos, rather than governing the state. That fact must 
be underlined to understand the role of Turkish Army in Turkish policy. On the other 
hand, the religion and minority issues had the central role in the democracy 
discussions since the establihment of Turkish Republic. 
To understand the political context that AKP emerged through, the period of 
Turkish politics since the military coup of ‘September 12, 1980’ need to be 
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investigated. The 1982 Constitution, which is referred as September 12 Regime, 
aimed to impose on the society an authoritarian and a conservative statist conception 
of politics. It placed the statism at the center of the princible of republicanism, and 
this princible narrowed the civil politics.71   
Between 1980 and 1999, the only breach in the authoritarian state-centered 
view occured through the economic liberalization under Özal’s masterly leadership.72 
Some attempts toward political liberalization were held under Özal’s leadership. In 
that term, Özal as a modernizationist conservative took serious steps to fullfil the 
democratic rights of conservatives. The conservative liberal synthesis found fertile 
ground for self expression and integration to political system. Many former Islamists 
had the chance of integration to the polical system. 
In 1990s the main issue of state was the ethnic terrorism in the South East part 
of Turkey. For the sake of the struggle against the terrorism some human rights are 
restricted and the democracy eroded. What’s more, populist economic policies of the 
government resulted with periodic economic crisis. As a result of economic problems 
and bad governance, religion oriented political party RP won the general elections in 
1995 as the biggest single vote getter party with 21.4. It built up coalition government 
with DYP. But after a year in February 28, 1997 covert military intervention occured 
and RP - DYP coalition government resigned. As it is called in Turkey ‘The February 
28 Process’ was not limited to the political wing of the Islamist movement. Islamic 
networks, sects, associations, and the individuals were targeted for excoriation and 
sometimes prosecution or court-ordered bans on their activities. Accustomed to gentle 
official treatment, the larger community of Islamists was traumatized and left with 
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deep new doubts with the benign character of the state authority.73 Regarding political 
theory, it meant that, Islamists and conservatives were pushed to peripheriy.74 So that, 
after ‘February 28’ Islamists had serious democratic problems: Ban of headscarves, 
handicap of İmam Hatip graduates. After that term ethnic terrorism in the South East 
part of Turkey continued. In that region RP had tried to create policy depending on 
the historical brotherhood of Muslims.75 After ‘February 28’ political Islamists 
needed to develop more modern and comprehensize democracy perspective which 
tries to fullfil the needs of different groups in the society.  
AKP leadership which came to power with the 3 November 2002 elections, 
performed good record in its first year regarding democracy. It made legislative 
reforms to fullfil Kopenhagen criteria which mainly aim democratization of candidate 
states. Meanwhile it was great chance that the terrorist activities of PKK were 
weakened. Perhaps the most important aspect of AKP’s election victory regarding 
democratization is that the Islamists and conservatives which were once pushed to 
periphery by the intervention of ‘February 28’, were represented in the system and 
took leading role in the democratization process. 
It can be argued that Turkey moved towards liberal democracy in the first 
years of AKP. In that term, some EU institutions argued that though Turkey made 
democratic legislative reforms on paper, they were not executed properly. It can be 
translated that Turkey satisfied formal democracy criterias, rather than substantive 
ones. It must be noticed that European Union integration process is the most 
important and powerful political anchor for the democratization of Turkey.  
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4.5. Impacts of external politics on democratization of Turkey  
Since the first serious democratization experience in Ottoman Empire, foreign affairs 
has been one of the most important facts that reinforced the democratization process 
in Turkey.76 In the periods of two global democratization waves which were 1950s 
and 1980s, Turkey had experinced important democratization processes.77 The time of 
the other global democratization wave in 1920s was a special period in the history of 
Turkey as it has been fighting for its independence against imperial powers. 
During the Cold War, as Turkey was a member of NATO and anti-communist 
pact it was not questioned whether Turkey was a democratic state or not. It was 
directly accepted as a member of Western Pact which consists of liberal democratic 
states. On the other hand, by the collapse of communism Turkey needed to satisfy the 
criteria of liberal democracy in order to be accepted as a Western state. So, the 
democracy became an important parameter in its relations with the democratic 
Western Pact. In other words, the static political relations between Turkey and US 
during the Cold War, has gone over.  
By the end of Cold War, US as a superpower revised its global political 
strategy. New strategy proposed to bring liberal democracy to the states which lack it. 
The project ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA)’ also needs 
to be investigated in that context. Now, most of the states in the Middle East are 
governed by authoritarian regimes and the leading opponent groups in that states are 
different Islamic movements. US policy argues that in the democratization process of 
these regimes moderate Islamic acts can play an important role. In that respect, 
Turkey as the only liberal democratic Muslim country took much more attention as an 
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example for these authoritarian states to establish democratic regimes.78 But this 
political vision of Western policy makers irritated internal identity problems of 
Turkey and it was refused by the Turkish political establishment, because it is 
believed that this policy could damage the secular characteristics of state.79 However, 
as the only democratic Muslim country Turkey is still a very important case and the 
stability of Turkey in the region as a liberal democratic state is very strategic for US. 
It is emphasized by the statements of US officials for many times. 
The other target of US policy towards Middle East is to foster the regime 
changes in the authoritarian states; Iraq, Iran and Syria in the region. For Turkey, it 
meant that the neighbors of Turkey would be the enemy of US which has been the 
close ally of Turkey for more than 50 years. Turkey did not give support to this 
policies. In return US looked for new allies in the region, in Iraq case it was Kurdish 
groups. In Iraq War, US cooperated with Kurdish groups to topple Saddam regime 
and as a result Iraq Kurds took serious advantages in the country. Turkey believed 
that this will irritate the ethnic conflict in Turkey where its Kurdish minority could 
appreciate their relatives in Iraq. Actually, the official Turkey policy of Washington is 
that all these internal problems is going to be solved by the establishment of real 
means of liberal democracy in the country.80  
On March 1, 2003, Turkish Parliament (TBMM) narrowly rejected a 
resolution to allow American ground troops to use southeastern Turkey for an 
invasion of northern Iraq. That decision of TBMM needs to be determined regarding 
the democratization process of Turkey. Especially European and Muslim countries 
had assumed that Turkey could not reject that resolution as it has close political and 
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military ties with US. In other terms it is thought that the freewill of public in the 
TBMM will be manipulated. But TBMM rejected the resolution as most of the 
Turkish citizens were against that decision. As a result the decision taken by TBMM 
increased the reputation of Turkish democracy in regional and global politics.   
For Turkey in the last 10 years, the EU process has been the most important 
anchor for satisfying the criteria of liberal democracy. From that point of view, US 
have been supporting the integration process of Turkey to EU.81 To summarize among 
the relation aspects between US and Turkey in the last 10 years, it must be underlined 
that the democratization have been one of the most crucial parameters. 
Finally, during the integration process of Turkey to the EU, the situation in 
Turkey regarding democratization have been one of the most important parameters. 
Especially by 2001, Turkey performed serious legislative reforms to satisfy 
Kopenhagen criterias which mainly measure whether the candidate state satisfies the 
criterias of liberal democracy or not. Since 2001 seven legislative reform packets 
were accepted.82 It should be noticed that AKP government gave very important 
impetus to this democratization process to satisfy EU criteria. Only in seven months 
four reform packets were legislated. That satisfies the party program of AKP where it 
declared that it will satisfy all the criteria to be a member of EU.83 It is argued by the 
party leaders that they performed these legislative reforms mainly for bringing 
democratic conditions to their citizens, rather than EU political target. But it must be 
considered that it should be really hard to take the support of the great portion of the 
citizens and the state agents without such a strong political aim. To sum up, relations 
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with EU have been one of the most crucial issue in the democratization and 
liberalization process of Turkey nearly for the last 15 years. 
* * * 
To recapitulate, this chapter was an attempt to reveal that democracy is a very 
vague concept. Today, majority of people refers to liberal democracy when they speak 
of democracy. Therefore, we dealt with the concept of liberal democracy in chapter 4. 
Since the end of World War II, the influence of liberal democracy rose in World 
politics. By the end of Cold War, it has been the only global political ideology 
without any serious alternative except political Islam. Liberal democracy is used as a 
tool of political legitimization for many political and military acts like Afghanistan 
and Iraq War. As it has been accepted as the main threat to liberal democracy, the 
interaction between political Islam and democracy has been a very popular issue 
among scholars, politicians and the media. This interaction is also very important for 
Turkey which is a Muslim country governed by democracy and having free elections 
for more than 50 years. 
 The AKP government is a new phase for the democracy experience of Turkey 
as it is accepted as political Islamic party. During its government AKP has been the 
main political actor for the democratization process of Turkey. As AKP is political 
Islamic party, that fact seems contradictory. In the next chapter, I will try to 
understand the social and political contexts which have influenced the democracy 
understanding of AKP. Also the ideological framework of the party is examined to 
determine the democracy understanding of the party. 
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Chapter 5 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
 
As a political actor, AKP stands in the focus of my micro cosmos. To determine the 
democracy understanding of mainstream political Islamic movements in Turkey, I 
investigate the democracy understanding of AKP, which is accepted as the main 
representative of political Islamic act in Turkey by most of the scholars. Because of 
this acceptation and other reasons that are mentioned in the study,  AKP is accepted as 
political Islamic movement. 
 
5.1. Social and political context through which AKP emerged 
Though they are related with each other, it will help us to differentiate internal and 
foreign political environments through which AKP emerged for understanding its 
ideological framework. Regarding internal political and social context, it must be 
remembered that in 1990s Turkish economy met with several economic crisis. In that 
period, corruption and political scandals eroded the legitimacy of the current political 
parties and the institutions. In consequence, public voted for alternative parties nearly 
in all elections for punishing the current parties.84 In that respect, AKP as a newly 
founded party with new names has been the most serious alternative. In addition, 
AKP as a conservative party, which referred to moral values utilized the lack of moral 
legitimacy of current political parties that are engaged with political corruptions.  
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Though it demostrated an important social phenomenon, one aspect of the 
election victory of the AKP did not take enough attention of the scholars and 
commentators. Serious portion of the rural population immigrated to the big cities and 
established ghettos there for housing since 1960s. The first political impact of this 
immigration wave began to be seen in 1990s. It can be argued that these former 
immigrants became the most powerful segment regarding voting power. So, they 
began to shape the politics. As an example, in the rise of RP and to some extent the 
election success of MHP that fact played crucial role. But in all these political 
movements these immigrants are represented indirectly by the political figures 
coming from other social classes. On the other hand, by Tayyip Erdoğan and other 
important figures in the AKP, ghettos for the first time were represented in the 
assemply by the names coming from that socia - cultural segment of the society.85   
Above mentioned two main facts created suitable social-economic condition 
for the emergence of political Islam in Turkey. But some political phenomenon like 
‘February 28’ process, also gave impetus to the emergence of AKP. So, the year 1996 
is important for the rise of political Islam in Turkey. In 1996, as the winner of the last 
political election, the Islamic party RP succeeded building up the coalition with DYP. 
It was the first time that Islamic rooted party succeeded in the elections in Turkey. But 
in a year, both domestic and foreign policies of the government created tension 
between Islamists and seculars in the society and disquieted the state establishment. In 
the end, it was inability of the coalition government to satisfy a number of criteria for 
secularity outlined in a document by the National Security Council as its meeting on 
February 28, 1997 which brought the government to downfall.86 Till the launch of 
AKP, political Islamic parties FP and SP founded as followers of RP could not 
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succeed to attract the public interest in the elections. This fact showed that classical 
way of making politics in political Islamic lost impetus and new alternatives are 
looked for. In that respect, AKP can be accepted as the transformation of classical 
political Islam in Turkey as it considers the realities both in domestic and foreign 
politics. In the political victory of AKP, the anger of conservatives who once voted 
for different parties in the right wing, towards the ‘February 28’ process must be 
considered. Also the political prohibition and imprisonment of Tayyip Erdoğan 
supported that public feeling. By the help of AKP in the leadership of Erdoğan, the 
conservatives again had the chance of taking place in the democratic political system.    
The postmodern intervention of ‘February 28’ was perhaps the most important 
recent fact that played role in the transformation of political Islamic movements to its 
current line. That transformation was observed among the political elites and the 
public supporters of political Islam. AKP which has been established by the political 
leaders most of whom experienced that change can be seen as the clear result of that 
transformation. That new frame of politics is based on culture and identity which refer 
to religion.87 But it must be underlined that this is different than the political acts 
which directly make politics with religion. In general it can be concluded that it is in 
parallel with Bell’s definition that accepts the culture, identity and religion as the 
recent spaces of new ideology which it was noticed in the former parts of my 
dissertation. (See page 10) 
The transformation after ‘February 28’ can also be observed in the rhetoric of 
charismatic leader of AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan. Regarding his new political perspective 
Erdoğan was declaring that: “By conserving fundamental principles, I have changed 
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and will go on changing”.88 That change had different dimensions. Regarding the 
place of religion in politics he told that: “We have left behind conducting politics with 
religious symbols. On the other hand, we shall show everybody how believers should 
act in politics.” He was implying that they would no longer use discourse that would 
seem to the secular establishment as inclination towards Shari’ah rule.89 In the same 
term he explained his views regarding laicism: “If some one still talks about state 
governed by Shari’ah, I do no take him serious. I think that the only solution is 
laicism. State should be separated from religious. It will guard the rights of religious 
against non religious and also guard rights of non religious against religious. That is 
laicism and the state will be organized to give minimun level of religious service.”90 
One of the most important impacts of ‘February 28’ is that it brought the 
human rights and democracy issues to the agenda of broader portion of public. It was 
especially new issue for the conservatives who mostly favored for the statist politics. 
That impact is felt mostly on political Islamic acts and their supporters, which 
suffered the ‘February 28’ process. Till that time political Islam and its representative 
in Turkey MGH (Milli Görüş Hareketi - The National Vision Movement) did not give 
enough attention to human rights and democracy. They have mostly noticed the 
problems about the restriction to the so called Islamic life style practices. By 
‘February 28’ they noticed that they need more universal democracy framework 
which will not only support the rights of the citizens who have Islamic identity but 
also other segments of the society. Only by that comprehensive democracy approach, 
they could struggle for the rights of their voters politically. In this vein their foreign 
politics differentiated from the previous Islamic acts. This difference is observed 
mainly in the EU policy. Though the former Islamic acts were against EU, AKP from 
                                                
88
 Çakır, Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan-Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü, (Istanbul: Metis Press, 2001), 231. 
89
 Heper, Toktaş, p. 17. 
90
 Çakır, Çalmuk, p. 180. 
51 
the day it is founded playing very clear pro - EU political strategy. The interviewees 
that I talked with, supported the EU policy of AKP. Democracy promises of EU is 
dominantly important than the other promises like economic and social benefits for 
most of them. However, by the recent discussions in EU about the secular state and 
related applications confused their mind. The comment of Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan regarding the decision taken by the European Court of Human Rights which 
gave the decision that the ban of headscarves in the universities in Turkey, reflects the 
reaction of AKP. Tayyip Erdoğan argued that EU Court of Human Rights have not 
legitimacy to give decision on such a topic about the belief.91  
‘February 28’ process also had economic and business impacts. By ‘February 
28’ new emerging conservative Anatolian companies and businessmen lost power. 
Some resources like the former interior minister Meral Akşener noticed the fact that 
via ‘February 28’ Istanbul based big conglomerates that stopped the power of 
Anatolian companies.92 The big banking and corruption scandals that resulted in 
economic crisis in years 2000 and 2001 supported that thesis to some extend. In that 
respect, traditional businessmen who have significant social and political impacts in 
rural areas gave great support to AKP.93  
In the last five years, the big business conglomerates and their owners began 
to take more important roles in politics. As they wish to integrate to the global 
business system, they took standings for democratization in that period. In that 
respect, they prepared and announced the democratizatiom report. It was the first time 
that via TUSIAD backed up for the democracy.94 In the coming years, they 
consistently fostered that policies and in accordance with that strategy TUSIAD has 
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been one of the most pro - EU institutions in the country. But it must be underlined 
that, this political vision is quite new and in ‘February 28’, they had indirectly 
supported state establishment. But in accordance with its new democracy vision, their 
historical relations with political Islam has been changed. On the other hand, AKP 
applied social economical politics that favored the integration of the Turkish economy 
to the global economical system. So TUSIAD has been one of the most important 
civil actors which supported the legitimacy of AKP government in the global political 
arena. That new relationship helped AKP to change the classical rhetoric of political 
Islamic acts, which was against the big corporations, especially the ones in the finance 
industry. As a result of this new relationship AKP began to see liberalization as an 
organic part of democracy. But most of the AKP elites that I talked with, argued that 
there is not a direct relation between liberalism and democracy. 
One of the other significant issues regarding the political context of Turkey 
before AKP won the election is that the security issues regarding the Kurdish 
terrorism began weakening. This problem had helped the parties MHP and DSP to 
win the the recent elections. If this problem had been still in the top of the agenda of 
the public before the ‘November 3, 2002’ election, probably AKP should not have 
achieved such a big voting power. 
 
5.2. Foreign political context 
When we thought of the period which AKP has been launched and came to power, the 
most important foreign issue was ‘September 11’ terrorist attacks to US. AKP has 
been established just three months before the attacks. For US and Western countries 
terrorist attacks to US in ‘September 11’, resulted with a new security and political 
paradigm. Regarding that paradigm, Islamic terrorism is accepted as the main source 
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of threat to the democratic states and the lack of democracy and liberties in Muslim 
countries foster the terrorism. So that US should work for supporting democracies in 
Muslim countries. It was a shift from the former strategy of US towards Muslim 
countries, as it prevented democratic initiatives in Muslim countries where political 
Islamic acts were the most powerful opposition groups. As these acts have 
considerable legitimacy in public, US and Western states were afraid of these acts to 
come to power and establish Islamic states. But after ‘September 11’ it was thought 
that as the current establishments in the Muslim states surpass the political acts by 
violating principles of democracy and as a result the power of these acts rise 
continuously. That creates a suitable environment for Islamic oppositions which tend 
to terrorism as in the case of El-Kaide. To prevent terrorism from integrating political 
Islamists to democratic process is began to be supported. The project ‘Broader Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA)’ was developed by US in that new 
perspective.95  
 In that strategy as the only Muslim and liberal democratic state, Turkey has 
important place as a concrete case of the fact that democracy and Islam can live 
together. As it was mentioned above, by the government of AKP, it was the first time 
that an Islamic rooted political movement came to power with free elections and 
performed for certain period.96 AKP as a party which has Muslim identity and also 
accepts the ideals of democracy seems like the ideal political partner for such a 
strategy. Before Iraq War, it was pointed that if a state which is governed by an 
Islamic rooted party like AKP cooperates with US in the Iraq War, it will be quite 
helpful to tackle with the legitimacy problem of war in the Muslim World. AKP did 
not give the open credit to US for the Iraq War. Though the resolution to allow 
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American ground troops to use southeastern region of Turkey for an invasion of 
northern Iraq is rejected, US went on working with AKP in many issues in the region, 
rather than working with the state establishment which it used to do so. But because 
of the Iraq intervention, the AKP elites had deep suspicious about the US political 
agenda towards Muslim countries. On the other hand, an important portion of the 
AKP elites underlined that they appreciate US democracy conception in its hometown 
but not in the foreign states.  
 In brief, when we considered the democratization strategy of Western states 
after ‘September 11’ which is mentioned in above parts of the dissertation, it can be 
argued that the emergence of AKP is in parallel with the global political trends. (See 
page 34) It can be argued that the process experienced in World politics after 
‘September 11’ has contradictory impacts AKP elite’s democracy perception. Firstly, 
new policy of US which foster democracies in Muslim World is seen as an 
opportunity for AKP elites to certain extent. That policy of US and relation of AKP 
with US; is seen as an important political support for AKP in Turkey against possible 
state interventions to their government. On the other hand, US policy both in local and 
international arena which suspects all Muslim as a potential terrorists frustrated AKP 
elites.  
The EU integration process is another important issue in foreign relations. But 
it must be noticed that after ‘September 11’, EU also began to consider the threat of 
Islamic extremism. So that, the importance of Turkey as a Muslim democratic state 
trying to join the union nearly for 40 years has risen. In that context, also before its 
elections victory, AKP was the party that has announced aggressive political agenda 
to join the union. In its program AKP declared that it will make all the political 
reforms that are needed to join EU. When it has been the government as a single 
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party, it made all the needed political reforms. As EU process and the related political 
reforms weakened the power of state establishment, the EU process became an 
important political tool in internal politics for AKP. AKP hoped that the EU political 
reforms will help Turkey to overcome the restrictions against freedom of expression, 
headscarves and the Imam Hatip schools. Mainly these restrictions are accepted as a 
result of the intervention of the state establishment on politics and daily life. And as 
the power of state establishment weakens, to overcome the above mentioned 
restrictions will be easier. So that almost all AKP elites with whom I interviewed, 
underlined the importance of the EU process regarding that perspective. Nearly none 
pointed about the economic advantages of the EU process. It supports the above 
mentioned thesis to certain extend: Turkey is going through a paradoxical period in 
which statist - Westernizing elites are forced to move into anti - Western positions and 
the West was defended by Islamic movements.97 But the recent politics in EU 
countries like France and Holland regarding the Islamic minority confused the minds 
of the interviewees. For example, the prohibition of headscarves in French schools 
made interviewees to conclude that EU is not clear about the issues regarding Muslim 
minority. As an example, one of the political elites mentioned that the major reason 
that he supported EU is the human rights regarding respect to beliefs, but by the 
recent decision taken in France to ban the headscarves in schools confused his mind 
about EU.  
    
5.3. Its linkage with political Islam  
One of the key issues in my dissertation is the relation of AKP with political Islam. 
As it is mentioned above the theoretical frame of the political Islam is quite vague and 
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there is no consensus on a single definition. Therefore, I shall use one of the most 
general and practical definitions of it: Political Islam refers to the political concepts 
which accept Islam as a system of belief that has something to say about how politics 
and society will be ordered in the modern world.98  
While determining the linkage between political Islam and AKP, hermeneutics 
analysis which accepts all social and political issues and facts to be determined in 
their own context is quite helpful. And in some sense, political Islam is a very local 
concept and needs to be investigated in its own specific circumstances. So that 
without considering the above mentioned part ‘The context through which AKP 
emerged’, it is hard to determine the Islamic characteristics of AKP. 
Despite its local characteristics, the above mentioned definition of political 
Islam is a quite broad approach and produced by non - Muslim intellectuals. That 
ironic fact creates some bottlenecks in investigating the political Islamic acts. Because 
of this problem, most of the Islamic acts in the World and the ones in Turkey do not 
describe themselves as political Islamists, rather they underline that they are Muslim 
and, naturally, it is observed that, this fact has impact on their world view to certain 
extend, which is in very large range. Except four of the interviewees, the Muslim 
identity is felt in the answers of them to the interview questions. For example, one 
interviewee said that he is Muslim and prefers to live in the state whose legislative 
system is based on Muslim rules but it is hard to satisfy the regarding conditions in 
the political context of current World.99 In other words, he percieved that his wish is 
utopic. 
In addition to hermeneutics, another social concept that is quite helpful to 
understand political Islam is constructivism which has also been referred in the above 
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sections of the dissertation. First, constructivism assumes that any society is a human 
construction and subject to multiple interpretations and influences. That approach 
helps us to understand how the civil politics replaced the ideological politics, so that 
we can determine the places of culture, religion and identity in political Islam. In that 
respect, Islamic political identity is accepted as a fame of reference that is 
unconsciously internalized through socialization and becomes politicized. 
Furthermore, it is objectified in relation to desired ends and a changing social 
context.100 To some extend that fact also exists for the case of AKP. It is observed in 
my interviews, official party documents, speeches of top names in the party. In all of 
these resources it is seen that, AKP and its elites try to define themselves out of any 
ideology. Instead, they underline their identities and cultures. If we determine AKP in 
that way of constructivism, it is possible to determine it’s linkage with political Islam. 
 The above given definition of political Islam is both very global and also local. 
It is global because nearly in all Muslim countries, political Islam exists and says 
something about how the politics and society will be ordered in the modern world.101 
The global trends reinforce the political Islamic acts nearly in all Muslim countries.  
The method of hermeneutics analysis helps to understand both global and 
local characteristics of political Islam. According to hermeneutics, every single 
question will be investigated in its own micro cosmos. In that cosmos main issues and 
concepts that affect the question take place. And that social question could be 
understood in that context.  
On the other hand, political Islam is very local concept as it is noticed in the 
above mentioned definition that policies differ regarding how different societies 
understand Islam and what it says about how the politics and society will be differed. 
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Those interpretations differ from countries to countries and take different shapes 
regarding the history, the social economic structure and the geography. As in our 
dissertation the method of hermeneutics analysis is used, the relation between AKP 
and political Islam is needed to be investigated in its own cosmos, which is Turkey. 
 In the micro social-political cosmos of Turkey, the leaders and elites of AKP 
are accepted as political Islamists. Actually, this understanding is parallel to above 
given definition of political Islam. But none of the elites that I talked with define 
themselves as Islamists. Two of them said that the ideal political system is the one 
which is designed according to Islamic laws, but they do not see this is realistic.102 
There are two more people who believe that Islam has something to say about how 
the social rules will be shaped to certain extent.103 If the definition that political Islam 
refers to the political concepts which accept Islam as a system of belief that has 
something to say about how the politics and society will be ordered in modern world, 
is accepted all these four people can be categorized in a class of political Islamists. 
As it is mentioned in the above parts, history always played crucial role in the 
political Islamic acts (See page 19). Political Islamists who believe that Islam has 
something to say about how the politics and society will be ordered in the modern 
world, need to refer to the history to prove that in the history Islam succeeded 
ordering the society for many times. It also exists for AKP elites to some extend. 
Certain portion of the interviewees also referred to the success that Ottoman attained 
in the history to prove how the Islam could play positive role in social and political 
life. That is the fact especially for the interviewees who come relatively from lower 
social-economic status of society. But it must be noticed that, in the official papers 
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and the declarations of AKP leaders, such approaches and references are not 
observed. 
Different researches, questionnaires and analysis also put AKP in the category 
of Islamist according to the related definition. For example, nearly 28 percent of the 
AKP voters arrange their daily life according to the Islamic principles.104 To be more 
concrete ladies and men sit and talk in different rooms. And except one or two 
ministers, nearly all of the wives of ministers have headscarves. Without discussing 
whether headscarves and above mentioned discrimination between men and women 
are Islamic rooted or not, we only notice that these behavioral patterns are accepted as 
symbols of Islam in micro social cosmos of Turkey.     
 In the recent micro political cosmos of Turkey three main issues that caused 
political and social conflicts are; ban of headscarf, restrictions on the İmam Hatip 
High Schools and restriction of alcohol sales in some districts of cities. These 
discussions categorized the society in two parts: The ones who favor the impact of 
Islamic values in daily life and the ones who do not. AKP government is in the focus 
of these discussions and takes very clear position in the favor of formers. Actually, 
three issues have very important symbolic meanings regarding Islam for the Turkish 
citizens. AKP leaders and elites argue that their policies regarding these issues are in 
the extent of respecting to the values and beliefs of public.105106107 On the other hand, 
AKP politicians do not seem to have common and clear opinions about the other 
issues like the demands of Alevi and the restrictions of alcohol sales in some districts. 
Regarding these discussions, AKP’s general perspective can be summed up such as: 
The demands of these groups and minorities conflict with the demands and the world 
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view of majority who are called as public by AKP elites. For example, in the case of 
Alevis, significant portion of interviewees argue that the Islamic interpretation of the 
ones who call themselves as Alevi, is not proper according to the common Islamic 
interpretation of public.108 On the other hand, in the case of alcohol sales restrictions, 
it is argued that the existence of restaurants with alcohol in the city centers disturb the 
public. From that point of view, it can be argued that the alcohol consumption and the 
habit of going to restaurants with their family are very low in public. So that it can be 
assumed that the important portion of the public favors the decisions of AKP 
municipalities. But majority is not the only source of legitimacy in the liberal 
democracies.109 That approach conflicts with AKP’s stand regarding the issues like 
the ban of headscarf in universities. Though most of the students in the universities 
are without headscarves, AKP do not bother about the view of majority in that case. 
To conclude, it can be argued that AKP does not have democracy perspective for all 
cases. 
 
5.4. Ideological framework 
The main sources to determine the ideology of any political act are its official papers 
and documents. Before AKP is launched Tayyip Erdoğan had declared that the 
political identity of the coming party will be ‘conservative democracy’. In a 
conference ‘International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy’ held by AKP 
to discuss its official political philosophy, AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan underlined 
that AKP accepted the concept of conservative democracy as its official political 
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philosophy.110 It is the first time that a political party needed to define its political 
philosophy and to declare it to be discussed by public and intellectuals. So, the 
concept of conservative democracy stands in the core of AKP ideology. It is a good 
starting point to discuss the ideology of the party.  
According to the AKP, the conservative democracy proposes universal 
democracy understanding that does not conflict with the values of public. The main 
dynamic of that democratization is the support of public.111 That concept is discussed 
by scholars and commentators, and it is noticed that there is not any concept in 
political science literature which is called conservative democracy. And that concept 
is called as eclectic as two concepts –conservative and democracy- that are not 
consistent with each other to be synthesized organically. It is proposed that, these two 
concepts, conservatism and democracy, contradict with each other as conservatism is 
about conserving the values of society, however, when anyone is democrat it is hard 
to conserve these values.112 But that argument is rejected that: “The ones who call that 
concept as eclectic make such a mistake that they think conservatism is equal to 
statism. But actually statism is not the only concept under the topic of conservatism. 
There are some conservative political movements which performed very reformist 
politics. When that is understood it will be seen that democracy and conservatism can 
be integrated.113”   
When the party program, election manifesto and ‘urgent action’ plan of the 
AKP is determined, three outstanding categories, which are not unfamiliar to Turkish, 
centre right parties come to the fore. The first feature that can be described as the 
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‘synthesizing tendency’ is related to the self-definition of the party. AKP defines itself 
as democratic, conservative, reformist and modernist. It argues that AKP cannot be 
classified under left or right wings of classical political terminology. With the term 
democratic, the emphasis is on ‘a vision of Turkey... where differences are perceived 
not as a source of conflict but as richness.’ The conservative feature of the party is 
expressed in the perception of Turkish society as a big family with a common fate, 
sharing bitter and sweet memories. The reformist and modern aspects are lumped 
together in the assertion of the will to prepare Turkish society to meet the challenges 
of globalization.114        
The above mentioned political frame puts AKP in civil politics, rather than 
ideological politics. As it is mentioned in the first parts of the dissertation, the mass 
ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, instrumental and created by the political 
leaders.115 In parallel to that, the normative consensus held that civil politics replaced 
ideological politics that no comprehensive changes should be introduced and no 
changes in the way of life should be undertaken if they could not be reversed.116 AKP 
refers to the common values of the public and underlines that it refuses to propose the 
alien policies and ideologies to the characteristics of nation and to the public. So, 
AKP shows normative understanding of politics. What’s more, AKP mostly refers to 
culture and identity and tries not to be categorized under any political ideology. In 
Turkey, identity and culture are related to the religion very much. And the main 
characteristics of civil politics are that it refers to culture, identity and religion as AKP 
did, rather than ideology.   
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The center and definitive role of Tayyip Erdoğan for AKP is also quite parallel 
with the political trends of the last century’s Asia and Africa. As it is noticed in the 
above portions of the dissertation, the mass ideologies of Asia and Africa are 
parochial and instrumental and these mass ideologies and politics are created by 
charismatic political leaders like Tayyip Erdoğan.117 In parallel to this view, 46 
percent of AKP parliaments said that the most significant reason for AKP’s winning 
the ‘November 3, 2002’ parliamentary elections is the fact that AKP has charismatic 
leader.118 
It is argued that the ideological frame of the concept conservative democracy 
has lots of similarities with the concept of conservative liberalism.119 But AKP 
accepted conservative democracy instead of liberal democracy as it does not fully 
accept the ideology of liberalism.120 In the party program of AKP, it is observed that 
democracy and the values of the public are two of the concepts that were referred 
most.121 
Though it refuses to define its ideology as liberal AKP has overtly displayed 
its neo-liberal leaning both in its pre-election discourse and its practices after coming 
to power. The neo-liberal and market based approach that dominates the party identity 
in the economic preferences has been symbolized by the emphasis on ‘making Turkey 
an international trademark’ and in Erdoğan’s rather ambiguous description of his 
party’s plan for transforming active politics into the politics of merchants. Thus, 
regulations in the socio-economic sphere are realized on the basis of privatization, 
creating incentives for foreign investment and compliance with the criteria determined 
by the IMF. Both prime-minister Tayyip Erdoğan and finance minister Kemal 
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Unakıtan used the rhetoric of ‘marketing Turkey’ in may times during the discussion 
about the privatization of the AKP. Tayyip Erdoğan also critisized the opponent 
parties as they make the nationalism of capitalism.122     
Adherence to neo-liberal principles is also prevalent in the party’s policy 
setting in the sphere of public administration. Both in the official documents of the 
party and in the draft of law on public administration reform prepared by the AKP 
government it has been repeatedly emphasized that there is a need for an overall 
transformation in the public administration system via privatization and 
decentralization in local government. It is seen that the AKP perceives 
decentralization as a means for more efficient conduct of public services in a 
managerial fashion. Underlying such a perception is the conception of the state as a 
mechanism for service to people which coincides with the dominant argument that 
shaped ANAP and DYP discources in the eighties and nineties.123  
As it is noticed above, actually the liberal characteristics of AKP is more 
dominant than its democratic characteristics. The definitons of the concepts liberalism 
and democracy also support that argument. (See page 9) So that, it is important why 
AKP underlines that ‘conservative democracy’ is consciously preferred as official 
party philosophy, rather than ‘liberal democracy’. It can be assumed that that 
preference has also important pragmatic and instrumentalistic reasons. In most cases, 
liberalism is not so sympathetic concept for public, also in so called liberal and 
democrat countries like US. For example, in a research made in Turkey it is asked to 
the voters that “What is the characteristics you looked for while voting?”. Despite 
28.4 percent of interviewees answered as that ‘being democrat’ is the main characters 
I am looking for while voting, only 5.3 percent answered that they are looking for 
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‘liberalism’ while voting.124 As most of the voters do not have indepth knowledge 
about the theoratical frame of ideologies like democracy and liberalism, their answers 
mostly depend on their perception of these concepts rather than their conceptual 
meanings. So that, it can be argued that while AKP choosing ‘concervative 
democracy’ instead of ‘liberal democracy’ party elites also considered the public 
perception of regarding concepts.125 
 When the interviews with the party elites are investigated it is seen that some 
comments of them are in parallel with the above mentioned analysis which depends 
on mainly the official texts of party and the party top leaders. Nearly none of them 
defined their political view directly as conservative democracy. It is normal that this 
political concept is quite new and that phrase is used first by AKP leadership. What’s 
more, except four of them, they do not want to categorize their political view in any 
ideology. Instead, they prefer to refer political values to define their political views. 
Most common values which they referred are democracy, national values and human 
rights.126 During the interviews it is also observed that the significant portion of 
interviewees refer to the views and policies of their party leader Tayyip Erdoğan. In 
that respect, AKP, again suits the condition of Daniel Bell’s definition of mass 
ideologies and civil politics observed in Asia and Africa in the 20th century. As we 
mentioned in the above given parts of the dissertation, these ideologies are 
instrumental and they are created and manipulated by charismatic leaders.127  
 Interpretation of the interviews shows that AKP elites do not think in the same 
way with the AKP leadership in some political issues. One of them is economic 
liberalism. Though nearly all of them defined themselves as democractic, they do not 
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see economic liberalism as a fundamental pre-condition of democracy. On the other 
hand, in the public speeches AKP leadership uses very neo-liberal rhetoric, especially, 
about the subjects related to the economic issues.128 Despite this neo-liberal rhetoric, 
it is argued that the way of Tayyip Erdoğan’s policies need to be defined as 
instrumentalist, rather than neo-liberal. When AKP and Erdoğan’s views are 
evaluated in a broader range, they seem much more coherent to instrumentalism and 
pragmatism than neo-liberalism.         
 When the political perspective of AKP is compared with RP, which is the 
main political Islamic party after 1980, very sharp differences are observed. As 
Tayyip Erdoğan underlined, AKP has different way than the political perspective of 
National Vision, which is the political philosophy of RP. It is seen that AKP launched 
very different political vision regarding different issues like economy, foreign affairs, 
democracy and human rights than RP. When compared with RP, the policies of AKP 
can be accepted as much more liberal, democratic, realistic and in the axis of global 
values.129 
 
5.5. Democracy conception  
When the party discourse and the documents on democracy are analyzed, it is seen 
that AKP satisfies most of the fundamental characteristics of liberal democracy. But 
still, some aspects of its view contradict with the liberal democracy model. This 
contradiction is observed in especially participatory principles. So, in some cases the 
AKP’s interpretation of democracy seems like ambiguous. This interpretation can be 
determined on the basis of four dimensions that feature in party discourse repeatedly. 
Firstly, the party expresses its commitment to democracy with recourse to individual 
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rights and liberties, and with tolerance towards difference, which is in line with the 
liberal democratic model. This is especially observed in the AKP’s disposition 
regarding in the process of Turkey’s membership of the EU.  
The second dimension is related to the AKP’s definition of democracy as “... a 
political race for serving the nation and a regime of tolerance”. This definition can be 
read in terms of the metaphorical connection between the family and society – read as 
the Turkish nation – and the definition of political activity on the grounds of the 
‘revelation of national will’ and ‘consensual platform that excludes conflict’. Such a 
formulation is explicitly in line with an organic approach to society and politics, and 
thus contradicts with the above mentioned first dimension.130  
Third, the party also pays tribute to the pluralist conception of democracy. 
This is most evident in its economic preferences. What’s more, its policies regarding 
Kurdish issue and Armenian genocide discussions is in parallel with that perspective. 
On the other hand, AKP does not encourage different portions of the society to take 
part in decision taking process in some issues like the ban of sales of alcohol in some 
districts. That contradicts with the party’s claim to support participatory democracy. 
In this respect, the fourth dimension, which concerns the party’s claim to support 
participatory democracy, is illuminating. The party tries to substantiate this support 
with recourse to the draft law on public administration. Such a connection might 
appear to be appropriate at first glance, especially, on the basis of governance 
principle, which stipulates a decision-making mechanism that is not concentrated in 
the centre/state but composed of a network of agencies participating in due course.131 
But in some cases AKP tries to overrule law. It damages the law of freedom which 
also guarantees the rights of every citizen against the tyranny of majority.    
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            Democracy in the conservative democratic scheme is formulated with 
reference to an organic understanding of society -in AKP terminology- the Turkish 
nation. It is obvious that this scheme might in future conflict with the practice of 
individual rights and liberties. If it is accepted that the only hardship that Turkish 
democracy faces is the dominance of the military in civilian affairs, then AKP stands 
as the ideal candidate for a democratic opening up. A critical analysis of the AKP’s 
ideological identity, which is relational to state - individual and society - individual 
relations, as well as to the issue of social rights. By some scholars it is argued that the 
transformation that AKP might possibly bring about does not connate a 
transformation from state - centered to society - centered politics, but a shift in state-
centered politics with a different political cadre. This fear is mainly related with the 
fact that Turkey has not strong democracy tradition. What’s more the three factors in 
the AKP’s identity strengthen the doubts about the party policies. First, the shift noted 
above embodies conformity with neo-liberal principles. Second, the bulk of AKP 
members have a historical -if not organic- association with the National Vision 
Movement tradition. Third, Islam - though in an allegedly ‘depoliticized’ form - still 
occupies a significant place, especially, in the party’s approach to democracy. The 
combination of these three factors tempts one to conclude that AKP rule means a neo-
liberal policy with a Muslim face.132       
If we consider the opinions of party elites regarding the concept of democracy, 
one will see that they mostly refer to the restrictions of headscarves and religious 
education. That approach is quite normal as they meet with these problems in their 
daily lives. Following ‘February 28’, the importance of democracy and human rights 
had been understood more thoroughly. It is seen that the only way to guarantee human 
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rights is developing a global democracy approach which considers different segments 
of the society. In that respect, it is an important fact that nearly 30 percent of the elites 
said that more rights to the people who are Alevi, should be given.133 When the 
classical rhetoric of political Islam in Turkey is considered, it is a sign of important 
break from political Islam.  
It is a good point to discuss why AKP defined its official political philosophy 
as conservative democracy, rather than liberal democracy. As it is mentioned in the 
above chapters of the dissertation, liberalism is the rule of law which prevents certain 
personal rights or free spaces from the control of state. On the other hand as it is 
mentioned above, democracy is the concept where all citizens had the right to govern 
the certain portion of the political authority.134 If we analyze the interviews and the 
rhetoric of party elites, most of the problems they pointed out are the issues related 
with the lack of liberalism. So, it is seen that most of these problems can be solved by 
liberalism. The citizens have the right to be elected and to vote. In that respect, 
political participation, which is the main practice of democracy, is also the most 
essential right of liberalism. So, liberalism and democracy are historically 
interrelated.135  
* * * 
To summarize, this chapter has tried to reveal that ‘Political Islam’ is also a 
vague and problematic concept. I preferred to use one of the most practical definitions 
of it: Political Islam refers to the political concepts that accept Islam as a system of 
belief that has something to say about how the politics and society will be ordered in 
modern world.136 According to this definition AKP is regarded as political Islamic 
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party. AKP has been the main political agent of democratization process in the 
country since its government. This fact is a signifier of the transformation of political 
Islamists in Turkey. There are different aspects of that transformation: Social, 
political, economical and foreign political conjuncture. Within these aspects, the 
intervention of ‘February 28’ plays crucial role. By ‘February 28’ process the 
democracy demands of conservatives in Turkey rose. Also, Islamist politicians 
understood that they need to establish a political framework which depends on 
universal democracy understanding. External political conjuncture also affected the 
new policy of political Islam in Turkey. Also, Western pact supported the 
democratization processes in Muslim countries. 
 In chapter 6, the democracy understanding of AKP elites was set out through 
indepth interviews made with AKP elites. While designing these interviews formal 
and substantive democracy criteria were taken into consideration. 
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Chapter 6 
What do AKP elites perceive of democracy? 
 
Before trying to adress the question that what the AKP elites understand from 
democracy, few points should be measured carefully. First of all, this dissertation 
does not compare the democracy understanding of AKP elites to that of the other 
party elite’s understanding. Instead AKP elite’s democracy understanding is analyzed 
with respect to the formal and substantive democracy criteria.  
 When the answers of interviewees are considered, it is seen that world views 
of interviewees satisfy the basic criteria of democracy. As it is mentioned above, 
democracy is simply the concept where all citizens had right to govern the certain 
portion of political authority. The criteria of formal democracy are inclusive 
citizenship, rule of law, seperation of powers, elected power-holders, free and fair 
elections, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, associational 
autonomy and civillian control over the security forces. Except one of them, all elite 
said that they favor these criteria and underlined that they are democrat. But, mostly 
direct questions are misleading in interpretation so alternative questions were asked. 
Doing so, it is determined that dominant portion of the intervieews percieve the 
attitudes; ‘respecting to different values, beliefs and ideologies’ and ‘defending 
liberties’ as the main characteristics of being democrat.137 They mostly emphasized 
the importance of two criteria; elected power-holders, civillian control over security 
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forces and seperation of powers. In addition, some also critisized especially the power 
of bureaucratic institutions like security forces and legislation.138  
As it is mentioned in the preceding chapters of the dissertation, according to 
theories of democracy, the existence of formal mechanism and procedure is a 
necessity but by no means a sufficient condition for democracy. So that, criteria of 
substantive democracy need to be considered.139 The substantive democracy is a 
process that has to be continuously reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in 
a way to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in 
which they live to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that 
affect the society. When we go over the interviews, we see that they lack the concept 
of substantive democracy. For example; ‘considering the ideas of society during the 
decision making process’ is not referred as one of the criteria of democracy. 
On the other hand when the basic definition of liberalism is compared with the 
above given democracy perception of interviewees, it can be argued that democracy 
perception of AKP interviewees satisfy the criteria of liberalism, rather than 
democracy. But it should be noticed that it is hard to differentiate liberalism and 
liberal democracy as they have series of common criteria. 
Parallel to that, the majority of the AKP elite referred to the countries like 
Japan, US, Canadia and UK as examples of the most ideal democratic states, rather 
than Continental European states. The percentage that refer Continental European 
States as an example for ideal democratic state is significantly lower than the Anglo - 
Saxon democracies and Japan. 
But one must notice that the intervieews have contradictory feelings about US 
due to the current foreing politics of US especially in Middle East. Some interviewees 
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emphasized that US is democratic in internal politics, but not in foreign politics. Such 
negative comments of interviewees can be taken as the consequence of US Middle 
East policy on the perception of AKP elites. These comments do not mean that AKP 
elites feel less symphathy to Anglo - Saxon democracies when compared with the 
other universal democracy practices. 
It is also interesting that significant number of the interviewees expressed that 
they like Japan for its democracy understanding. They noticed that Japan succeeded to 
conserve its values and consider its public will while getting the universal democracy 
criteria.  On the other hand, only one interviewee referred Nordic democracies as the 
most ideal democractic states. Despite the universal popularity of Nordic 
democracies, such attitudes of interviewees are quite symbolic. 
On the other hand, it is observed that the elites are sceptic toward EU 
regarding its democracy understanding. Only 15 percent of elites told specifically that 
they appreciate EU democracy. As it is mentioned above they favor Anglo - Saxon 
democracies as they believe that Anglo - Saxon states favor personal liberties much 
more. One of the main reasons of that scepticism is the recent governmental practices 
towards Muslim minorities in these countries. During the interviews many of them 
referred the recent regulations like ban of wearing headscarves in public schools and 
hospitals.140 Recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights which gave the 
decision that bans wearing headscarves in the universities in Turkey is not against 
human rights.141 These decisions had significant impact over the perception of elites 
towards EU and its democracy practices. 
Another reason of the EU skepticism is the EU integration process of Turkey. 
EU critisizes Turkey because of not satisfying conditions of human rights. Especially 
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discussions about minority rights fostered that scepticism, especially for nalionalist 
elites. They believe that EU has hidden political agenda towards Turkey, rather than 
aiming democratization of Turkey.  
 
6.1. Future perspectives 
The election victory and then the government of AKP is an important case for the 
future of democracy both in Turkey and in the world. AKP will be the first Islam 
oriented political movement which came to the power with free elections and then 
ruled the country for certain period in the history.142 If AKP do not lose government 
by any anti-democratic intervention or process, it will be special case for proving the 
fact that political Islam and democracy can live together.  
The case of AKP is also a strong message to the supporters of the political 
Islamic movements in Turkey who have been disappointed by ‘February 28’ process. 
By the government of AKP they have seen that a political Islam originated party is 
allowed to come to power and manage the state in the democratic regime. It should 
also be considered despite the ‘February 28’ intervention, mainstream Islamic 
movements preferred to struggle within the borders of democracy, rather than via 
illegal activities like terrorism. So the importance of that political experience could be 
seen better.  
One can argue that the party elites integrated with democracy much more 
during AKP’s governance period. Negotiation and democracy practices had even 
played an important role in the establishment of the party. It is known that there are 
three main political fractions in AKP: Islamists, nationalists and liberals.143 Though 
the roots of the party based on political Islam, that core fraction needed to negotiate 
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with and compromise different political views to establish a political party which will 
come to the power and win the election. For AKP leadership, it was a choice between 
being core Islamic movement or being Islamic rooted conservative movement. Tayyip 
Erdoğan and the other party leaders chose the second alternative. In the interviews 
there is no sign that this choice is questioned or criticized even by Islamist elite.144  
AKP elite still experience democratization process in the party. Even though 
AKP leader Erdoğan seems like an authoritarian leader, he is tolerant to the 
discussions within the party to some extend. In some cases internal party opposition is 
greater and more effective than the opposition of different parties or external 
opponent groups.  When the tradition of political parties in Turkey is considered, 
AKP can be accepted much more democratic than most of the other parties. It can be 
argued that such democratic experience will make AKP elites more tolerant to 
different views. The social impacts of that democratic environment on the political 
Islamic movements should be observed better in the long run.  
Apparently there are some certain threats on that internal democratization 
process. Firstly, majority of the AKP elite think that state establishment which consist 
mainly army and legislation bodies is obstacle to the democracy.145 Most of them 
think that state establishment prevents democratization especially in some issues. 
They believe that owing to the state establishment the citizens lack basic human rights 
which are mainly related to religion.146 The ban of headscarves in public spaces and 
the problems of Imam Hatip High School graduates in university entrance 
examination are the two common symbolic examples for these rights. But they are 
still optimistic about the solution of those problems. It is felt that AKP leadership, 
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mainly Tayyip Erdoğan plays critical role in that respect. He is is able to control the 
reactions of its supporters whose demands are not fulfilled.  
Regarding the above mentioned demands and problems, AKP leaders and 
elites mostly use rhetoric of opposition. They imply that despite the fact that they are 
government, they could not take the necessary steps for the solution of the problems. 
The party leaders give message to their supporters that they do not want to cause 
regime problems and discussions. In that respect, they advise the supporters to be 
patient. Under certain circumstances this is a problematic situation in terms of 
democratic regime. If those demands continue and the problems could not be solved; 
the feelings of disappointment can take the place of hope and patience among the 
party supporters and elites. At the end, it is possible that they can feel disappointment 
towards democracy and democratic regime. Then a crucial question comes up to one’s 
mind: What will be the reaction of AKP elites in such a condition. At that point AKP 
leaders, especially Tayyip Erdoğan will again play important role.  
As it is mentioned above the basic demand of the AKP elites regarding 
democracy, is the restriction of the sovereignty of state establishment in certain areas. 
For example, two of the elites told that the army staff in the Western countries are 
normal officials who do not have any exceptions and report to the government but in 
Turkey they have very large rights and that is anti-democratic.  Also important portion 
of the elites said that in Turkey legislative bodies have political characteristics and do 
not perform their duties properly. The elites believe that these state bodies create 
pressure and restrictions over citizens with regards to religious beliefs.147  
Having conducted 15 indepth interviews, it is felt that if these problems are 
solved AKP supporters and elites will not have any serious demands relating to 
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democracy. Nearly 50 percent of the elites argued that if the above mentioned 
problems which restrict the private space of citizens, are solved Turkey should be 
much more democratic than the Western states. However it is observed that they do 
not give adequate attention to the substantive democracy criteria. As it is mentioned in 
the former parts of the dissertation the substantive democracy is a process that has to 
be continuously reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in a way to 
maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they 
live to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that affect the 
society.  
From a point of view, it is perceived that the democratic demands of AKP 
elites and supporters are mainly about liberalism, rather than democracy. In Western 
liberal democracies, economic freedom is an important parameter. However AKP 
elites and supporters do not deal with economic freedom as an important aspect of 
democracy at all. Nearly 80 percent of the elites told that economic liberalism is not a 
prerequisite for the democracy. On the other hand nearly 70 percent of the elites 
underlined the importance of civil society as an important institution for properly 
working democracy. This perspective is closely related with the tradition of political 
Islam in Turkey. Most of the political Islamic movements, even AKP has its roots 
stemmed from MGH (Milli Görüş Hareketi - National Vision Movement). Different 
foundations and NGOs -most powerful was National Movement Foundation- played 
important roles in the organization and politics of MGH especially when there are 
restrictions on the political Islam. Moreover, historically NGOs have taken important 
place for different religious communities and sections in Turkey. These groups 
organized their activities via these NGOs historically. To summarize AKP elites focus 
mainly on the religious freedom of citizens and the border of private space in daily 
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life, rather than how the individuals influence the conditions in which they live. 
Therefore, it is hard to argue that public and also AKP supporters have a strong 
motivation for further democratic reforms.  
One of the weakest points of democracy is that it can create a tyranny from the 
majority. So, that fact is also questioned in the interviews. Nearly all the elites told 
that for establishing a new regime like Islamic or socialism, taking the support of the 
majority of the citizens is not enough. In other words, they think that any party or 
political group who wants to establish different type of regime and took the public 
support, still does not have the legitimacy of changing the current regime. That 
approach can be considered as a signal that regime discussions can lose its importance 
in the future. 
EU process will be significant both for the future of democratization and the 
AKP. From day one, AKP had been a keen supporter at EU process. AKP used the 
EU process for democratization and doing so; fulfilling the demands of its supporters. 
For breaking the power of state establishment EU is leveraged as a critical tool.   
Obviously strategy of AKP has certain bottlenecks. Firstly it is not clear to 
what extend EU process will help to fulfill the demands of AKP supporters regarding 
the ban of headscarves and Imam Hatip Schools. In the last year some EU countries 
restricted the use of headscarves in public spaces in their own countries. European 
Human Rights Court also rejected the file of Turkish girl who argued that his 
university right is restricted because of headscarves. What’s more publication of the 
cartoons of prophet Mohamed in some EU countries in the name of press rights was 
risen questions regarding the values of EU. All of these cases signal that EU process 
could not fulfill the demand of AKP supporters. In the meanwhile rising minority 
terrorism in Turkey causes the rise of nationalist tendencies in the country. Some 
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politicians relate the rise of terrorism to the result of EU democratization process 
which gave many rights to minorities. In that internal political conjecture it will be 
problematic for AKP leaders to support EU process. 
The interviews also support the above mentioned rising skepticism about EU 
among AKP supporters and elites. Nearly 40 percent of the elites told that they do no 
believe that EU is sincere about democratization request. It is observed that above 
mentioned cases has important part on skepticism. But still nearly 70 percent of the 
elites accept that EU accelerated the democratization process of Turkey. For example, 
one of the elite told that it was impossible to perform the recent democratization 
reforms. Majority of the elites accept EU as a tool on the way of democratization and 
the development of the country, rather than Turkey’s being the part of EU. 
In parallel to the EU skepticism it is seen that the AKP elites have different 
approaches to certain issues. Firstly, important portion of them do not recognize 
crucial democracy problem if the issues like headscarves and İmam Hatip Schools are 
solved. Except two ethnically Kurdish elites no one thinks that there is an important 
minority issue in Turkey. What’s more these elites do not except Kurds as minority 
and believe that their problems should be solved under the topic of human rights, 
rather than minority rights. 
Though the support given by the public to the EU process has weakened, EU 
is still the most important tool for AKP to restrict the power of state establishment. 
But in the future it will be harder for AKP leaders to use EU tool for democratization. 
So they will probably need to look to alternative strategies for fostering liberalism and 
democracy. 
* * * 
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To summarize, the interviews made with AKP elites illustrate their political 
perspectives satisfy the fundamental criteria of democracy. It is seen that their 
democracy understanding is mainly about protecting civil liberties of public from 
state authorities. So it can be argued that from a certain point of view their 
understanding has a tendency towards liberalism, rather than democracy. 
The basic demand of the AKP elites regarding democracy is the restriction of 
the sovereignty of state establishment in certain areas. So that, they hope the problems 
like the ban of headscarves in public space and the disadvantageous of Imam Hatip 
High School graduates will be solved. Seemingly, the elites argue that except these 
problems there are no serious problems regarding democracy in Turkey. It is possible 
that if these demands of AKP supporters are satisfied in the future they will probably 
not demand the democratization of Turkey. On the other hand, if these demands are 
not fulfilled, politically problematic scene will take place. AKP supporters and 
conservatives could feel disappointment towards democracy and democratic regime. 
Moreover, both cases are problematic for EU integration process of Turkey. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
In the last 10 years two political issues; liberal democracy and political Islam drove 
attention more and more both in local and global political levels. The spread of liberal 
democracy and the role of political Islam are questioned and discussed in that term. 
By the end of Cold War, liberal democracy has spreaded globally and political Islam 
has risen as the only mainstream alien ideology to liberal democracy especially in the 
Muslim World.  
 In that period very important interactions between political Islam and 
democracy are observed in Turkey. Though Islamic originated party RP won the 
election and governed for a year, it was overthrown in 1997 by ‘February 28’ process. 
From that time and onwards, political Islam refreshed its organizations and politics. 
Main political Islamic movements continued struggling in the limits of democracy, 
rather than working with illegal methods like terrorism. In that period, a notable 
number of the political Islamic leaders and elites have been liberalized. By this new 
perspective, a group of former RP leaders established AKP and won the elections in 
November 2002.  
When the last three years of AKP in the government is considered it is seen 
that it fostered democratization of Turkey and in that respect it has been the main and 
most powerful political actor that has supported EU process. All these efforts are 
observed by skepticism by the significant portion of society from different opponent 
groups. It was argued that AKP uses democratization and EU process to break the 
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power of state establishment which is the main protector of the current laic regime. 
Such speculative ideas are to be left out academic discussions and do not make any 
sense to this dissertation.  
On the other hand, to observe the liberalization of AKP elites and leaders, this 
view should be considered: It should be allowed for the possibility that circumstances 
may force, trick, lure or cajole non democrats into democratic behaviour and that their 
beliefs may adjust in due course by some process of rationalization or adaption.148 
When the rhetorics and political views of MGH and RP are compared with the 
political views of AKP elites, it is seen that the views of AKP elites are considerably 
more liberal. Furthermore, it must be noticed that political Islam originated party AKP 
set the democratization in its agenda and fostered the EU process. It is especially 
important in the period when political Islam is began to be accepted as an alien 
ideology to democracy in the Western World.  
Regarding internal politics, it is an important fact that political Islamists and 
conservatives who were disappointed by the coup of ‘February 28’, again integrated 
to the democratic process via AKP. They had the chance of being represented in the 
political system. For the future of democracy and political system in Turkey, that 
issue is much more important than the daily politics. If the certain of AKP elites has 
been transformed into more democratic behaviour, it will have positive impacts on the 
daily life and politics of Turkey.  
Our research is based on indepth interviews with 15 AKP elites, and 
introduced the democracy perception of AKP elites in detail. As AKP is the main 
representative of political Islam in Turkey, it also helped to determine the democracy 
understandings of political Islamic movements in Turkey. It can be said that the 
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results of research supported our thesis which is; “The representatives of mainstream 
political Islam in Turkey share common norms of liberal democracy understanding, 
though they differ in some points like the perception of economic liberalism and 
plurality.” As it is noticed in the thesis AKP elites who represent the current political 
Islam commit to the fundemantal values of liberal democracy. The democracy 
perceptions of AKP elites are investigated by two main sets of criteria: Formal and 
substantive criteria of liberal democracy.  
The answers of AKP elites to interview questions satisfy the formal criteria of 
liberal democracy in general. As it is mentioned in the above parts of the dissertation 
the main criteria of formal democracies are: Rule of law, seperation of powers, 
elected power-holders, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and alternative 
sources of information, associational autonomy and civillian control over the security 
forces. By direct and indirect questions the pespectives of elites to these issues are 
investigated. There is nearly no answer that is not appropriate with these criteria. 
What is more except one interviewee, they argued that democracy in Turkey lacks 
some of these criteria. They especially referred to these four criteria: Rule of law, 
seperation of powers, elected power-holders and civilian control over the security 
forces. More than half of the interviewees sign state establisment which consist of 
army and legistative bodies as the main reason of violation of these criteria. 
The main substantive criteria of liberal democracy are: Constitutional issues 
and legality, human rights and minority rights, political rights, media, administration, 
liberal economy, local government and civil society. Measuring these criteria is 
harder than measuring the formal ones. So the answers of the interviewees are more 
heterogeneous and confusing. Furthermore it is problematic to decide whether the 
interviewees are democrat or not, by the questions prepared in that perspective. These 
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criteria are mainly produced by the experiences and realities of Western democracies. 
But at the end these are the universally accepted main criteria of liberal democracy. 
Direct questions does not work too much to determine how the interviewees 
approach to these criteria. So indirect questions are used mostly. In that respect it is 
seen that minority rights, liberal economy and civil society are the three main topics 
to be discussed to understand the democracy perspective of AKP elites. For example, 
AKP elite’s understandings of minority is different than the EU proposed. In that 
respect, except three of them, none accepted Kurds as minority. To underline the fact 
that this democracy perspective is not specific for AKP elites only, it must be 
remembered that Kurdish political leaders also dismissed the classification of Kurds 
as minority by EU.       
The missing issue which is not investigated in detail in this dissertation is that: 
What is the relation between the concepts; ‘laicism’ and ‘democracy’? What is the 
laicism understanding of AKP elites? In that respect how do their laicism 
understanding affects their democracy understanding? In further researches these 
questions need to be determined. 
If the answers of interviewees are analysed by considering the above 
mentioned facts, it could be argued that dominant portion of the elites accepts the 
values of liberal democracy. Only three elites refuses most of the substantive criteria. 
On the other hand, the rest of the elites have different approaches towards some 
values and criteria of liberal democracy. For example, except three of the 
interviewees, the AKP elites do not accept free market as an important criteria for 
democracy. In the contrary, majority of the elites believes that civil society and NGOs 
are important institutions for properly working democracy.  
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These different attitudes show that while determining the democracy 
conception of Turkish citizens and Turkish political Islamists, the criteria and their 
approaches should not be compared one - to - one with liberal democracy 
understandings of Western people. Some differences regarding details shall not be 
taken as the clue of non - democratic world view.  
To conclude, AKP elites stil experince active democratization process. Stil, 
most of them accepts and favors the values of liberal democracy. It can be argued that 
in the coming years, AKP elites who are also the representatives of political Islam in 
Turkey will be much more democrat.   
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Appendix I 
 
Interviewee Set 
 
Age  Gender  Position in AKP 
 
 
 72  Male   Founder  
 
 61  Male    Founder 
 
42  Male   Founder 
 
 38  Male    Vice-President in İstanbul Organization 
  
39  Male   Vice-President in Beşiktaş Organization 
 
55  Male   Vice-President in Kartal Organization 
 
51  Male    Member in Eminönü Organization 
 
48  Male   Member in Üsküdar Organization 
 
57  Male    Member in Üsküdar Organization 
 
34   Male    Member in Sariyer Organization 
 
39  Male    Member in Fatih Organization 
 
36  Male    Member in Avcılar Organization 
 
33   Female  Assistant to Vice President in İstanbul 
Organization 
 
28   Female  Member of Youth Committee in İstanbul 
 
45  Female  Member of Gebze Organization 
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Appendix II 
 
Interview Questions 
 
 
1- What are the basic characteristics of ‘being democrat’? 
 
2- Which of the above mentioned characteristics do you have particularly? 
 
3- In all over the world, which are the most democratic states that you appreciate? 
 
4- Do you believe that the democracy models of above mentioned states can fit to 
Turkey? 
 
5- There is an arguement that, in Turkey state institutions protect state instead of 
persons. What do you think about it? 
 
6- To what extend is Turkey democratic state? Do you belive that Turkey needs to 
make improvements? 
 
7- Do you believe in that the relation between politics and state institutions could be 
as it is in Western democracies? 
 
8- Do you believe that ‘the rule of law’ could be suspended in extraordinary 
conditions? 
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9- Do you believe in that are civil society and liberal economy basic requirements of 
democracy? 
 
10- What do you think about the discussions in Turkey regarding minorities in the 
country? 
 
11- If your children want to marry with so called a person from so called minorities in 
Turkey what will be your reaction? 
 
12- What do you think about the role of EU process in democratization of Turkey? 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
